

# Group themes and readings

Thursday, 24 September 2015

13:43

1. WALLS and FENCES
  - a. Wendy Brown
  - b. Setti
2. BORDER CROSSINGS / CROSSING BORDERS
  - a. Politics of border
  - b. STÉPHANE ROSIÈRE and Jones
  - c. Parizot et al
3. MIGRATION AS EVENT / IMMIGRATION AS SURVIVAL
  - a. Held
  - b. Molodikov
  - c. Silverstein
4. CONTROL AND SURVEILLANCE
  - a. Parizot et al
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  - c. STÉPHANE ROSIÈRE and Jones
5. WAR, CONFLICT AND MIGRATION
  - Bennet (Thomas Demand)
  - Held



The Israeli Wall in the area of Qalandiya, North Jerusalem (Sebastian Bolesch).


Walled States,  
Waning Sovereignty

Wendy Brown

ZONE BOOKS · NEW YORK


2010

Rochester, MN Public Library



Barrier around the Spanish enclave of Melilla in Morocco (Chiara Tamburini).

The striking popular desire for walling today, considered in light of recent pejorative historical associations with walling and with contemporary walling's general inefficacy vis-à-vis its putative aims, can be traced to an identification with and anxiety about this sovereign impotence. The popular desire for walling harbors a wish for the powers of protection, containment, and integration promised by sovereignty, a wish that recalls the theological dimensions of political sovereignty. If the fiction of state sovereignty is the secularization of the fiction of divine power, the deteriorating viability of this political fiction generates understandable popular anxiety, an anxiety addressed in part by the theological effect and affect of walling. The detachment of sovereign powers from nation-states also threatens an imaginary of individual and national identity dependent upon perceivable horizons and the containment they offer. Thus, walls generate what Heidegger termed a "reassuring world picture" in a time increasingly lacking the horizons, containment, and security that humans have historically required for social and psychic integration and for political membership.



India-Bangladesh border fence (Veronique de Viguerie/Getty Images).

However architecturally interesting or complex, walls are conventionally regarded as functional instruments for dividing, separating, retaining, protecting, shoring up, or supporting. Whether constructing a building, holding back land erosion, or lining neighborhoods, walls are ordinarily perceived as intended for a material task. Yet walls are also commonly said to convey moods or feelings by their design, placement, and relationship to built or natural environments. They may set or foreclose political and economic possibilities and be screens for a host of projected desires, needs, or anxieties. In this respect, walls can be crucial elements in the making of what Edward Said termed "imaginative geography," the mental organization of space producing identities



Barrier separating Shiite and Sunni neighborhoods of al-Shula and al-Ghazaliyeh in Baghdad (Ali Al-Saadi/AFP/Getty Images).



through boundaries: “A group of people living on a few acres of land will set up boundaries between their land and...the territory beyond, which they call ‘the land of the barbarians.’” This “imaginative geography of the ‘our land—barbarian land’ variety does not require that the barbarians acknowledge the distinction. It is enough for ‘us’ to set these boundaries in our own minds; ‘they’ become ‘they’ accordingly.”<sup>1</sup>




Saudi barrier at the border with Yemen (Khaled Fazaa/AFP/Getty Images).

The new walls target the movements of peoples and goods often drawn by the pull within destination nations for immigrant labor, drugs, weapons, and other contraband, and not only from the press without.<sup>12</sup> Ideologically, the dangers that walls are figured as intercepting are not merely the would-be suicide bomber, but immigrant hordes; not merely violence to the nation, but imagined dilution of national identity through transformed ethnicized or racial demographics; not merely illegal entrance, but unsustainable pressure on national economies that have ceased to be national or on welfare states that have largely abandoned substantive welfare functions. As such, the new walls defend an inside against an outside where these terms “inside” and “outside” do not necessarily correspond to nation-state identity or fealty, that is, where otherness and difference are detached from jurisdiction and membership, even as the walls themselves would seem to denote and demarcate precisely these things. ~~Walls today~~




U.S.-Mexico border (Marc Silver).

Even if they could be distinguished, walls cannot be placed easily on the security side of a “security versus economy” matrix of contrary pulls toward bordering and unbordering. Such matrices continue to presume sovereign nation-states and the autonomy of the political and the economic. They also lack a place for the symbolic and theatrical dimensions of border fortifications. At best, staying strictly within an economy-security framing, walls could be characterized as (feeble) technologies in the “war of all” generated by neoliberalism itself, security measures responding to economically generated forces that themselves break down the legal spaces conventionally organized by political sovereignty and represented by nation-states. Walls represent the emergence of policing and barricading in the face of this breakdown and of the ungovernability by law and politics of forces produced by globalization and, in some cases, late modern colonialization.



India Pakistan border fence (Ami Vitale/Getty Images).

Ancient temples housed gods within an unhorized and overwhelming landscape. Nation-state walls are modern-day temples housing the ghost of political sovereignty. They organize deflection from crises of national cultural identity, from colonial domination in a postcolonial age, and from the discomfort of privilege obtained through superexploitation in an increasingly interconnected and interdependent global political economy. They confer magical protection against powers incomprehensibly large, corrosive, and humanly uncontrolled, against reckoning with the effects of a nation's own exploits and aggressions, and against dilution of the nation by globalization. These theological and psychological features of the clamor for walls help explain why their often enormous costs and limited efficacy are irrelevant to the desire for them. They produce not the future of an illusion, but the illusion of a future aligned with an idealized past. Sigmund Freud will have the last words here: "We call a belief an illusion when a wish-fulfillment is prominent in its motivation, and in doing so we disregard its relations to reality, just as the illusion itself sets no store by verification. . . . Having recognized religious doctrines as illusions, we are at once faced by a further question. . . . Must not the assumptions that determine our political regulations be called illusions as well?"<sup>53</sup>



U.S.-Mexico border (David McNew/Getty Images).



# Migrants' Art and Writings

## Figures of Precarious Hospitality

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**ABSTRACT** Time, precarious lives and memories and multiple narrations related to crossing borders constitute the key meanings of a series of contemporary pieces of works produced by migrant artists and writers (Tarek Al-Ghoussein, Marwan Rechmaoui, Jumana Emil Abboud and Hoda Barakat). Through an analysis of some of their works, this article focuses on some spatio-temporal images, actions and metaphors related to movement (crossing, walking through, passing borders). Then it questions the exploration of narratives in visual arts, especially the relationship between imaginary fiction and reality stories. Theatre may become the very place where contemporary tales of migrant people are translated, (re)told, performed. The very meaningful notion of hospitality becomes a theatrical practice in one of the most relevant spectacles of the Théâtre du Soleil, *Le Dernier Caravansérail (Odysées)* (2003). Another aspect of this creative hospitality – Leïla Sebbar's *Mes Algéries en France* – concerns the interweaving of memories belonging to opposite sides of divided countries, after the colonial wars. This work of collection, transcription, translation from one to another gives an example of writing (as fiction and narrative) as a repairing work but also of revelation of unknown connections.

**KEY WORDS** contemporary fiction ♦ hospitality ♦ migrant writers ♦ postcolonial memories ♦ temporality ♦ theatre ♦ visual arts

Nowadays, we have a view of our world as a planetary map crossed all over by many trajectories: those of products of the world market, those of migrant streams from South to North, from East to West (itineraries and directions change from region to region, in different periods). This kind of map varies quite often so that the representation of the world space is related to a changing time. It is a time of displacement, migrations, travels and transfers of merchandise or individuals, images, words. Postcolonial or neocolonial wars bring about the migration of entire populations, native and sedentary people become nomadic, citizens of one country become strangers, exiled, refugees, *sans papiers*, in other countries,

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where they are obliged to hold identity papers to be able to show the police and authorities. The decolonization process is followed by the globalization era where new forms of colonization emerge.

So the experience of being a stranger, an outsider, is much more common, is even an essential part of our human experience in these times. Border-crossing can be an ordinary act without consequences (study, business, tourist journeys) or an act of survival for those who leave their homes to escape disease, war and poverty. These migrants become neighbours, work colleagues, schoolmates of those who never had to leave. In our daily life we may cross in public or private space, as well as on web logs, people whose language and culture are completely or quite different from ours. These experiences lead to a rethinking of hospitality beyond the private space, into an enlarged, public and globalized one.

My first question is: how do artists and writers inscribe within their work this moving space and time, its instability and actuality? How do the visual arts, texts and theatre performances speak to us of these migrant itineraries and of the language of hospitality?

Since our world is a variable one, most contemporary artists choose materials and artistic forms typical of performance art (photos, videos, movies, electrical engines, mobiles). Since space keeps changing, images as texts cannot be fixed, but they transform themselves in time: for example, they circulate online, in a space whose limits are incalculable and then potentially without limits. If the idea of border implies a spatial representation, these works produce temporal representations on a world scale. Many texts stem from a strong feeling of fading origins and memories, of the fragility of ephemeral houses, from the consciousness of a loss of memory, of one's mother tongue and of one's collective and personal history. Politically engaged artists in the global and local context cross-examine the limits/borders between the fictional and the real world, especially when reality is characterized by war or economic disasters.

## (IN)VISIBLE BORDERS

The image chosen for the exhibition *Scènes du Sud II Méditerranée orientale*<sup>1</sup> is a tent in a desert, its blue covering suspended in the air, so that you cannot say if the tent is being put up or taken down. The photo catches a moment between two periods, before/after. It is an unfixed habitation, of

being in-between an arrival, a stay and a departure. The Palestinian artist Tarek Al-Ghoussein exhibits a series of photos printed on silk: they hang down from the ceiling so that visitors can walk among them, and see each one from either side. Visitors can invent various possible itineraries but they are never in a frontal and static position of voyeur/spectator; they can move around, between, up and down, looking at each photo from multiple angles. We find the idea of crossing in another piece of work, by the Lebanese artist Marwan Rechmaoui: his *Beirut Caoutchouc* (Rubber Beirut) is a large-scale reproduction of the map of Beirut, but there are no topographical indications, no names appear on the black map. The map is on the ground and visitors to the exhibition can walk on it. Visitors are there incognito, without name or identity: they are only characters in an imaginary space, in a temporary space and time (the exhibition). These crossings through the map leave almost imperceptible marks. So borders, frontiers, are entirely fictional: nothing allows us to distinguish this plan from that of any other town in the world. It is made of the same material as rubber-soled shoes: striding along and pacing over it, visitors use it, ruin it, mark it with their footsteps. Cuts become visible: frontiers are like cuts/breaks/fault lines that can end in the disintegration of the plan/town/work. This is especially meaningful precisely because it concerns Beirut, a town divided into many sectors, each self-contained and clearly delimited, so that to pass from one to the other passports must be shown at checkpoints, visible marks of internal frontiers that are not inscribed on the rubber map. Moreover visitors come to realize that their going through Beirut is a symbolic crossing, a fiction; where one moves between this piece of artwork in the exhibition and the real town, with its historical and cultural context. The transformation of a visitor into an active agent is the political element of this aesthetic proposition.

## THEATRE AND THE ART OF HOSPITALITY

The Persian *caravanserai* is a type of hostel built to accommodate entire caravans, with a yard and warehouses for animals and merchandise, and rooms for people. Do caravans still exist in our times? The play performed between 2003 and 2006 by the troupe of the Théâtre du Soleil, *Le Dernier Caravansérail (Odyssées)*, certainly deserves this name. The title and the realization of this spectacle perfectly signify the company's deep aesthetic, political and ethic vocation from its foundation in the 1970s. This is why it is such an essential reference in the itinerary I propose, in two fundamental

ways: being an example of modern hospitality, a space of collective and individual creation where everyone creates (oneself) in relation to the other(s); and since the way each actor/actress works is always open, always receptive to the other (character /performer/text), hospitality is mutual. As Hélène Cixous remarks in the programme of the spectacle:

Who are those refugees that our actors receive into their soul and their bodies? Who rest for a short ephemeral time in one or another caravanserai, who are those who receive our actors in their memory and destiny? . . . Ulysses is nowadays without name and without return. (Théâtre du Soleil, 2003)

The play is based on the transcription, assemblage and rewriting of several tales heard by the actors during the company's many travels around the world. Tales of true stories: some of them are those of the actors of the troupe, many others were refugees and *sans papiers*, *clandestins*, illegal immigrants living in the so-called *centre d'accueil* of Sangatte, others came from far away countries of the Middle East (Iran, Afghanistan) or the Southern hemisphere (Australia) or Eastern Europe (Russia, Chechnya). As one can easily imagine, the very history of our globalized world can be retraced in these tales. Instead of a printed play script (as is the case for other performances by the company), there is a kind of notebook where are registered the dates and encounters, the remarks of those who have told their stories, to those who have listened to them. Maps of their journeys are reproduced, often the same of contemporary migrations. Essential words in the vocabulary of a globalized world – refugee, hospitality, exile – are explained, documents reproduced, sentences written on the walls of Sangatte, recorded, translated and transcribed. One realizes the political impact of each of these gestures; and these clandestine and passing lives, persons and stories are given a time and space of existence, during the ephemeral space–time of the theatre. There, all of them can feel at home, they are *chez soi*. Even if they are considered *sans papiers*, without an identity card, they each have their names, origins, languages, dates, memories, places. At the very beginning of the play there is a scene that is emblematic of the theme of this issue of *EJWS*: a group of men, women and children try desperately to cross a river in turmoil, at the risk of drowning in its turbulent waters. Crossing borders is not without danger, these people jeopardize their lives in order to get to the other side. Unfortunately, this side is often a place like Sangatte, where people are imprisoned in an enclosed territory just because they have no identity cards (most of them have deliberately destroyed or thrown away their passports when passing the frontiers).

Of course, Sangatte is the example and the metaphor of conditional hospitality of a state deciding through its laws who will be admitted and who will not. This could eventually avoid the collision between the traditional law of hospitality and power that Derrida analyses:

This collision, it's also power in its finitude, that is the necessity, for the host, of choosing, electing, filtering, selecting guests and visitors, those who will be granted asylum, who will be given the right of visiting and getting hospitality. There is no hospitality, in its classical sense, without the sovereignty of the self in one's own home, but since there is no hospitality without finitude, this sovereignty can be exercised only by filtering and choosing, that is to say by the violence of exclusion. (Derrida and Dufourmantelle, 1997: 53)

But what does it mean being at home in a theatre during a performance? For the actors? In a modern *caravanserai*? One has to imagine an extra-territorial space where each one is at the same time an insider and an outsider, known and unknown, all differently a stranger at home. This play by the Théâtre du Soleil enriches the meaning of habitation, hospitality, outsider, stranger: one can be (wel)come to the performance without having to give one's name at the entrance, without stating one's identity. The power of the nation-state's laws to control entries and departures can be suspended in the theatrical space. In no way can this space become a territory with defined and exclusive – meaning controlled – borders. Moreover, even the stage is mobile, and this is another very effective metaphor of these tragic migrant stories: actors but also houses, rooms, tents, hospitals, shift across the stage (arrivals, departures). Habitations are temporary structures as persons can't stay in the same space for long, they cannot put down roots or build foundations. *Clandestins*, migrants cannot even touch the ground (the stage): each 'ground' is only a temporary one; only very few succeed in settling somewhere for any length of time. But on the stage there is a visible border, just in front of the spectators: a high wire netting and just in the middle a large rip through which migrants try continuously to pass. Almost all the scenes of *Sangatte* are attempts to cross the frontier and get to England. The word 'contemporary' is never more meaningful than on this stage, with its alternating scenes of what happens 'at the same time' in Iran, Afghanistan, France, Australia, Russia, England; through the stage, on the stage, all these migrant voices, languages and cultures communicate, and the public is both spectator and witness. Present time is necessarily a presence together, that allows one to be near, listening to their life tales, which happened elsewhere but are played here and now because of the hospitality of theatre. This community of presence (co-presence) make us conscious of the modern frontiers (wire fences, gates and walls); crossing them is an act of survival, not only an exchange or a simple getting through.

## PERFORMING BORDER-CROSSING

This dramatization of crossing borders returns in a performing artistic project by the Palestinian artist Jumana Emil Abboud. The stage is a 'real' one:

the land between Jerusalem and Ramallah. In a short text on the website *LiminalSpaces*, Abboud proposed her project *Smuggling Lemons*: the initial idea is to transport a lemon tree to the other side of the frontier, but this being almost impossible, because of the checkpoints, she imagines other ways of transportation and crossing. At every stage of the project there is a trespassing of territorial and property laws: to get the lemons she has to steal them in a garden enclosed by a gate, then she has to conceal them in a bag or a belt, finally she will transform them into lemonade in order to destroy the evidence of smuggling. Many aspects of this performance story are interesting for our theme: the development of the metaphor of putting down roots and of uprooting (of a lemon tree, of people living in-between), but even if we know that the uprooting of a tree and its transportation are possible, in her story Abboud chooses the transportation of fruits, the tree is not eradicated but parts of it can cross the frontier many times. The artist, a woman, carries them: her body has a very important function of container for the clandestine fruits to pass through the checkpoint. She is a migrant, a stranger, a smuggler but at the same time she is the site of hospitality. So the shift from carrying lemons to carrying her own daughter is not astonishing: she carries both in her arms, inside and outside her clothed body (lemons are concealed to pass the border). This artist, not only writes her piece, but, as the actors and actresses on a stage, performs it in different ways and engages her own body in it, as a woman and a mother, that means that in this case, gender is an essential element in the border crossing:

I want to smuggle lemons from Jerusalem to Ramallah. That's all. An entire lemon tree actually, but since I cannot technically carry an entire tree in my bag, I will make do with the lemons themselves. *Smuggling Lemons* is a project that has several components: a video work, an installation of the smuggled lemons, and a performance involving a lemonade stand that will take place at the completion of the project in order to eliminate all evidence of the smuggling operation. One can visualize a scenario in which an individual is awarded back the lemon tree from the very garden where the house he lost once stood. He may naively imagine that his loss of the house was due simply to geographical disorientation, or to a mistake made in the process of drawing a map. Imagine that you awaken one day to find yourself separated from both your house and garden, or to discover that your house has been cut off from your garden. You really want to quench your thirst with a cold glass of fresh lemonade. It occurs to you that the only way to do this is for you to steal the lemons from the tree (on the other side of the divide) in a precarious smuggling operation. This project will include the design of a special belt in which the lemons will be carried in order to facilitate their transportation. There will surely be times, however, when I will not be able to use the belt (during security checks, for instance, when the belt might look to some like a suspicious explosive belt); in such instances, the lemons will be carried by hand, placed in a purse, put under my armpits, placed inside my mouth or in a pocket, etc. I will make the journey from Jerusalem to Ramallah several times, carrying another batch of lemons each time. One can never foresee the route one will have to take, the situation at the border, or the possibility of



passing through checkpoints; hence the visual documentation of the journey. I will travel through the landscape, carrying the lemons in my hand or around my waist as if I am carrying my first born child, directing her attention to the landscape in all its glory, pointing towards my favourite spots, and upon arrival rocking her gently to say: Look, we are home. Once enough lemons have been smuggled, I will host a sort of celebration during which I will attempt to dispose of all the lemons by making lemonade out of them and selling all the juice. The lemonade will be very cheap, in order to encourage consumption of all the lemons and thus to eradicate, or at least question, the very idea of the lemon tree's existence. Lemons are like jewels. They represent the wealth and glory of the earth, a historical and personal encyclopaedia of cultural attachments and baggage. They symbolize heritage, memory and longing, national identity and individual acts of 'heroism' (or the illusion thereof), destruction and loss, betrayal and abandon; at the same time, the lemons could simply negotiate a ritual procedure involving the making of a fresh glass of lemonade. (Emil Abboud, 2007)

## MEMORIES AND IMAGES INTERWEAVING

The female performance artist in *Smuggling Lemons* not only crosses a border carrying her fruits (lemons/daughter), she weaves a connection between one side and the other, passing many times through the frontier (checkpoint). I would like to expand this idea of relation work through another example. Leïla Sebbar has created a series of books – *Mes Algéries en France* (2004), *Journal de mes Algéries en France* (2005) and *Voyage en Algéries autour de ma chambre* (2008) – with various content and material: fictional stories, autobiographical stories, interviews, photos and drawings. The covers of the books are a series of images like pieces of a mosaic, each one points to a story, to a fragmented memory. They do not suggest a linear narration or succession, they belong to distant periods and situations, their order is that of the personal recollections of the narrators and of the author assembling them. The assemblage is moved by the desire 'd'abolir ce qui sépare' (Sebbar, 2005: 11). The first gap is between two countries, her parents' homelands, France and Algeria (she was born in French Algeria). Reading allows us to pass from the author's memories, to her friends' or parents' memories, or to those of unknown persons, witnesses of the tragic period of colonization and of the independence wars. The terms connection and collection are especially relevant for this careful, meticulous work, similar in some ways to that of a historian (the Preface was by Michelle Perrot); nonetheless, Sebbar is above all a writer, borrowing often the voices and memories of others. Here she arranges her own archives and offers them to the reader: objects, cards, photos of coffee-shops, schools, graveyards of the colonial period in Algeria, family portraits, portraits of famous or unknown persons in Algerian history. Her parents' photos represent the image of a crossed journey: her father's from

Algeria to France, her mother's from France to Algeria. In the colonial period in *Algérie française*, European/French clothes coexist with traditional costumes from different regions of Algeria. With these books Sebbar is not only a *diseuse de mémoire*, a witness and narrator of this memory, she is also the collector of a mixed genealogy, she has to cross colonial borders, in the act of writing her own story, to go further than this familial space; she also collects images and documents of Algerian migrants living in France. Thus she moves from the colonial past to the postcolonial present: she creates a map where one can retrace the journeys, from place to place, from one story to another, as she multiplies viewpoints, voices, narrators, sources of memory. She transforms the colonial map into a postcolonial one through a double inversion of marks: being born from the meeting of her mother's and father's two trajectories through the colonial map of French Algeria, images suggest the crossing of foot prints: France's colonial foot prints over Algerian soil (schools, language, urban space), and those of Algerian migrants in the French landscape (coffee shops, soldiers' tombs). There are the marks of the journeys of French people who migrated to Algeria or who were born there, some of whom participated in the fight for the independence of Algeria. There are many women in this narration of passionate and singular destinies, some of them little known: the nurse and obstetrician Juliette Grandgury; the great ethnographer and resistance fighter Germaine Tillion; Josette Audin, Maurice Audin's wife, dying probably after being tortured by the French army, and others. Sebbar also recalls many Algerian women who became her friends in other contexts (such as the publication of the feminist revue *Histoire d'elles*). In these pages the function of the author is exactly that of a collector of witnesses' stories, memories and prints; she performs the literary inscription of hospitality; she receives, translates from one language to another, from images to words, from memories and countries.

\* \* \*

For some borders become invisible but for others they are still there, standing strong like great brick walls, an obstacle to their desire to get to the other side, looking for freedom or for a better life. Trying to cross may end in death. So it is clear that contemporary border-crossing is very far from an ideal cosmopolitanism, which is much more an intellectual conception. Migrants are fragile, vulnerable beings: their status is precarious; as women they are often kept in or pushed back to the other side (victims of fundamentalist laws separating sexes, abolishing desires and sexual liberty). The artistic choice to perform this space of migration exposes this vulnerability of the migrant subject, making the visitor/spectator/reader the agent of an aesthetic space of dangerous crossings and precarious lives, performing for a short time a dream of hospitality without conditions.

# Group themes and readings

Thursday, 24 September 2015

13:43

- I. WALLS and FENCES
  - a. Wendy Brown
  - b. Setti
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~~scious 'we' of Howard's logic is itself imagined.~~ The unity of the nation-state is achieved in and through the invocation of a border—the border functions in this register as the very object of imagination around which (national) identity is created and recreated. Contemporary discourses of national security and border protection are directed not simply at the exclusion of the unwanted other but also towards the production and regulation of political subjectivity within the polity. The border allows us to project a limit to the community and to create an 'us'. Jean-Luc Nancy tells us that this process of the creation of a community of unity (what he calls 'communion') is a form of 'mythic' thought.

Myth is that to which a political community appeals in order to found its existence as such and to perpetuate that existence as the intimate sharing of an identity or essence. The passage from the political to the sphere of politics occurs, then in myth, insofar as it is in myth that the existence of lived community is founded and perpetuated (James 2006, p. 196).

Nancy rejects this attempt to enclose the community, claiming that the community exceeds any possible representation of it. If this is the case then the border, as that which attempts to define a unity of community, is to be resisted.

Kafka's short story, 'The Great Wall of China', presents us with an interruption of the mythic thought of community's unity. As Peter Hutchings will later discuss, the story relates the building of the Great Wall of China through the eyes of one of its engineers. However, what begins as a simple tale quickly becomes something much more complex. We begin to see how the wall is in fact a technology of community. Because each of the very many engineers is periodically rotated around the country, the sense of the struggle for the wall creates the very sense of the community in unity. The wall operates in this order to enclose the community, much like in Benedict Anderson's analysis newspapers allowed for the creation of a sense of nation by involving the readership in imagining all the other readers (Anderson 1991). However, this nation-building does not end there, because Kafka goes on to overturn or deconstruct this sense of an operative unity of the community. His short story ends with a number of allegorical tales. The one that matches our purpose here is that of the monarch. The size of the country implies that no province knows the name of the current Emperor:

Thus, then do our people deal with departed emperors, but the living ruler they confuse among the dead. If once, only once in a man's lifetime, an imperial official on his tour of the provinces should arrive by chance at our village, make certain announcements in the name of the government, scrutinize the tax

lists... [when he mentions the name of the ruler] then a smile flits over every face.... Why, they think to themselves, he's speaking of a dead man as if he were alive, this Emperor of his died long ago, the dynasty is blotted out, the good official is having his joke with us.... If from such appearances any one should draw the conclusion that in reality we have no Emperor, he would not be far from the truth (Kafka 1973, pp. 78–79).

Kafka's community, despite the projected unity that the wall brings, is ungovernable. The imagined unity of the mythic thought is exceeded in every moment by the community itself. Thus, the question of the territorial unity given by the projected space of the border is to be rejected. Community always exceeds its mythic representations. This use of the border is an excuse to create an oppressive unifying notion of communion. As we can see, the politics of the border are not only reducible to the exclusionary and governmental functions of managing and dividing populations, of casting out and rejecting, but also of shoring up and stabilising that which remains within the border.

# Teichopolitics: Re-considering Globalisation Through the Role of Walls and Fences

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REECE JONES


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*This article considers the trend in many countries towards securitised immigration policies and “hardening” of borders through the construction of walls or fences. In contrast the borderless world of globalisation, it identifies these attempts to strengthen control of borders as teichopolitics: the politics of building barriers. This article analyses the different types of hardened borders that exist today and proposes a typology of frontlines, fences/walls, and closed straights. Then the article maps the locations of these barriers and argues that although other justifications ranging from smuggling to terrorism are often put forward, these barriers are mostly connected with managing immigration flows. Indeed, many of these barriers are located on important economic or social discontinuity lines, precisely where the system reveals its underlying logics. These walls and fences symbolise the emergence of a privileged few who actually live the promise of globalisation and defend its privileges through teichopolitics.*

This view, of course, was proven correct. Far from the optimistic representations of many scholars, the contemporary world is characterised by the increasing enclosure of territories *between* sovereign states through the construction of walls and fences on international borders and *within* sovereign states through the development of various methods of sustaining inequality such as gated communities. Even beyond the construction of physical barriers, this reality is underlined through new restrictive immigration laws that have been put in place around the world from Italy to the United States.<sup>4</sup> Rather than welcoming flows of people, these symbolic and physical barriers institutionalise privilege through legal exclusions and the blunt force of barriers.<sup>5</sup>

In order to conceptualise this new paradigm of long stretches of closed borders and the hardening of crossing points this article introduces the term *teichopolitics*. This neologism, coined by Ballif and Rosière (2009), is linked to notions of biopolitics and biopower proposed by the French philosopher Michel Foucault. These connected notions refer mainly to the practice of modern states and their regulation of individual lives and populations through “an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugations of bodies and the control of populations.”<sup>13</sup> In the case of teichopolitics, biopower is manifested in the denial of the right to move although this right is proclaimed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.<sup>14</sup>

The word teichopolitics is coined from the ancient Greek word *τειχος* (*teichos*) meaning “city wall”. Teichopolitics is, in short, the politics of building barriers on borders for various security purposes. The next section



**FIGURE 1** Border barriers: A world map (color figure available online).

Source: Habiter laboratory, 2010.



## TYOLOGY OF BORDER BARRIERS

Teichopolitics is not simply about building walls or fences. Instead, it encompasses the whole range of barriers that limit the movement of people and goods across borders including administrative measures and military installations which often support the barriers. Here we consider four types of border closure, which together capture the broader trend towards securitised borders.

### Frontline

The first type of closure border refers back to the older military purpose of boundaries and is characterised by the existence of an empty space (no man's land [*sic*]) separating two zones of military installations. This type of border closure has become increasingly rare as the vast majority of states have been integrated into the sovereign state system and have joined the UN which condemns the use of force in bilateral relations.<sup>24</sup> Most of the contemporary frontlines were primarily erected during the Cold War period and have been in place for many years. They often mark a disputed area

**TABLE 1** World border barriers: Location, length and typology (all lengths in kilometres)

| Country 1  | Country 2                         | Walls-fences | Front lines |
|--|-----------------------------------|--------------|-------------|
| <b>World Border Barriers</b> (alphabetically, with name of decision-maker first) |                                   |              |             |
| Abkhazia   | Georgia                           |              | 80          |
| Botswana   | Zimbabwe                          | 813          |             |
| Brunei   | Malaysia                          | 21           |             |
| China  | North Korea                       | 1416         |             |
| Cyprus (green line)  |                                   |              | 180         |
| Ethiopia   | Eretria                           |              | 912         |
| European Union (Schengen area)   | Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova | 4278         |             |
| Greece   | Turkey                            | 206          |             |
| India  | Bangladesh                        | 4053         |             |
| India  | Pakistan (Line of Control)        |              | 740         |
| India  | Pakistan (without LOC)            | 2172         |             |
| Iraq (US administration)   | Jordan                            | 238          |             |
| Iraq (US administration)   | Syria                             | 605          |             |
| Iran   | Pakistan                          | 909          |             |
| Israel   | West Bank                         | 785          |             |
| Israel   | Gaza strip                        | 51           |             |
| Israel   | Egypt                             | 266          |             |
| Israel   | Jordan                            | 238          |             |
| Israel   | Lebanon                           | 79           |             |
| Israel   | Syria                             |              | 76          |
| Karabakh   | Azerbaijan                        |              | 220         |
| Kazakhstan   | China                             | 1533         |             |
| Korean DMZ   |                                   |              | 239         |
| Kuwait   | Iraq                              | 240          |             |
| Morocco 'sand wall'  |                                   |              | 2720        |
| Russia   | North Korea                       | 19           |             |
| Saudi Arabia   | Iraq                              | 814          |             |
| Saudi Arabia   | UAE                               | 457          |             |
| Saudi Arabia   | Yemen                             | 1458         |             |
| South Africa   | Mozambique                        | 491          |             |
| South Africa   | Zimbabwe                          | 225          |             |
| South Ossetia  | Georgia                           |              | 100         |
| Spain  | Morocco                           | 17           |             |
| Syria  | Turkey                            | 818          |             |
| Thailand   | Malaysia                          | 506          |             |
| Turkey   | Armenia                           | 267          |             |
| United Arab Emirates (UAE)   | Oman                              | 410          |             |
| United States  | Mexico                            | 3140         |             |
| Uzbekistan   | Kyrgyzstan                        | 1099         |             |
| subtotal   |                                   | 27624        | 5267        |
| total  |                                   |              | 32 891      |
| %  |                                   | 83.9         | 13.1        |

where two states continue to claim territory on the other side and a peace treaty has not yet been negotiated (Korea, Cyprus, Israel/Palestine, Kashmir). The longest example of a frontline is in Western Sahara where Morocco built 2,700 km of fortified sand walls, which represent 51.6 percent of existing frontline on Earth. Nevertheless, frontlines still represent roughly 13 percent of hardened borders in the world (Figure 2).

| TYPE                          | FENCE              | WALL         | FRONT                         | CLOSED STRAITS            |
|-------------------------------|--------------------|--------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------|
| <b>Spatial organisation</b>   |                    |              |                               |                           |
| <b>Barrier Morphology</b>     | Fence              | Wall         | No man's land and front lines | Sea                       |
| <b>Cross-border relations</b> | Low to high        | Low to high  | Null (or low)                 | Low to high               |
| <b>Examples</b>               | Kazakhstan / China | USA / Mexico | Kashmir (India/Pakistan)      | Gibraltar (Marocco/Spain) |

### Legend :

|  |                        |  |                     |
|--|------------------------|--|---------------------|
|  | International boundary |  | Low density region  |
|  | Fence                  |  | No man's land / Sea |
|  | Wall                   |  | Military settlement |
|  | Synapse / gate road    |  | Town                |
|  |                        |  | Flows               |

Realisation : S. Rosière  
Cartography : Plantoni - 2009

FIGURE 2 Types of border-barriers.

## Fences and Walls

The second and third types of barriers are fences and walls, which are the most emblematic artifacts of teichopolitics. Despite the stigma associated with building walls after the construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961, since 2000 many countries around the world have initiated or expanded these barriers (Figure 1 and Table 1). In most cases, the barriers had been under consideration for some time and the underlying cause was often immigration, smuggling, or defining the state's population or territory. However, the overt justifications often revolve around the immediate threat open borders pose in terms of terrorism and security.<sup>26</sup> In total, fences and walls represent roughly 87 percent of contemporary terrestrial border barriers.

## Closed Straights

The final type of border barrier is the closed (or hardened) maritime strait. This kind of barrier is often forgotten by scholars but is very important for the purpose of controlling undesired migration flows. Straits are hardened if they coincide with strong wealth or political discontinuities (developed/less developed countries or free country/dictatorship) and are characterised by important undesired immigration flows. Examples include the Strait of Florida between the West Indies and the USA, the Gibraltar strait between North Africa and the EU or the Arafura and Timor seas between Indonesia and Australia). Such straits consist of a virtual fence implemented on the immigration side (the wealthy coast) and are organised around control towers to which various alarm systems, satellite, radar, and airplane reconnaissance are connected. These systems aim to detect the arrival of unauthorised boats and allow police vessels to be deployed to intercept them before they make landfall.

## A STRICT HIERARCHY OF FLOWS

Mobility is an increasingly paradoxical dimension of our societies. Communication and trade implicate flows, and flows are not only an aspect of globalisation but the *sine qua none* of its existence. They are supposed to reveal the dynamism of the global economy and signify the transnational age. Transnational corporations rely heavily on these connections and international organisations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) promote global trade by easing the movement of particular types of goods and people. At the same time, global flows remain the nightmare of governments, administrations, and security agencies, as the expansion of the world economy produces extreme imbalances of power and wealth. The border barriers of teichopolitics are therefore instructive because they demonstrate that all mobilities and flows are not valued, but rather that globalisation implies a strict hierarchy of flows which can easily be sketched. Financial



Crossing borders, people and goods have to pass through multiple networks and complex identification devices. Making sense of these mutations requires sustained in-depth analysis as well as a wide range of modes of inquiry, critical methodologies, and interdisciplinary engagements, that can open the path for creative research (Van Houtum, Kramsch, and Ziefhofer 2004; Rumford 2007; Wastl-Walter 2012, Wilson and Donnan 2012).

While atlases express stability, or rather give the illusion of it, the *antiAtlas* wishes to reintroduce borders' dynamic nature and complex manifestations, and to provide a critical approach to border representations. We assert that systematic graphic visualization of space is neither the most acceptable nor the most desirable way of understanding borders. This does not mean that we disqualify the traditional map, as we do not contest the usefulness of maps as knowledge tools. What we claim is that maps' systematic compiling does not provide an adequate understanding of the complexity of borders. Maps are not only political but also epistemological devices. They are not simply representations of territories and borders, but they also contribute to their production. Border making is intrinsically linked to map drawing, as maps make the border conceptually as well as practically possible. Maps are models that determine the forms of their production and lay the conditions to produce relations in space.

The study of territorial shape is less essential today than examining borders' physical inertia, their contextual materialization and dematerialization, as well as their social construction and highly technological nature. Increasingly, borders appear as evolving devices with electronic and biological characteristics that function as bases for mobile control and surveillance. At the same time, they shape exchanges, generate formal and informal rules, and produce random definitions of what is legitimate and what is not. What is at stake, thus, is to understand the border as a perpetually changing process, using an alternative set of representations that do not reify power positions the way atlases do. In this sense, we prefer the path of multiple investigations to unearth the multifaceted nature of border-making processes. Beyond their topography, borders address sociological, psychological, anthropological and ontological issues. This means that we need to pay attention at the same time to their locations, forms and shapes, as well as to their modes of existence, constitutive processes and imaginaries.

## From Territorial Control to Flows and Risk Management

The transformation of borders is intimately connected to the ways globalization has altered spatial interactions of all kinds, such as production chains, communication and defense systems, work and culture (Appadurai 1996). Freedom of mobility has been conceived through an economic perspective (Peck 2010; Amable 2011). Contemporary public policies that are usually qualified as "neoliberal" have been over-discussed and reinterpreted (Hilgers 2012), but it is widely admitted that they have promoted national reforms that include "free trade" and labor flexibility (Jacoby 2008, 2011), while promoting altogether on a global scale accounting standards (Mattli and Büthe 2005; Richardson and Eberlein 2011), banking prudential norms (Goodhart 2011; Young 2012), and fiscal consolidation (Kleinbard 2012; Blanchard and Leigh 2013; Hebus and Zimmermann 2013). At the same time, there are new strategies which aim at containing migratory pressures through the selective filtering of human flows (Shamir 2005).

These transformations have resulted in a contradiction between economic practices that increase unequal global development and the need to implement sustainable and fair global development (Sassen 2008). There is also a gap between national governments' policies, which are limited by their sovereignty, and the need to regulate transnational processes through global governance frameworks (Kramsch and Hooper 2004; Ba and Hoffmann 2005).

To address these contradictions, national governments have assigned state borders the function to guarantee people's security in a world characterized by transnational mobility of people, capital, goods and ideas. In other words, borders are supposed to allow a high level of mobility while protecting against social, economic, political, and public health risks the mobility of people generate.

While state borders are clearly more and more represented as legally intangible, it becomes increasingly problematic both for analytical purposes (Steinberg 2009; Johnson, Jones et al. 2011) and in terms of securitization (Brunet-Jailly 2007) to locate the border control within specific and stable places. The lines between domestic and external security have become blurred to such an extent that these domains are difficult to separate clearly. Yet, the role of borders does not decline. What is declining is the relative share of controls implemented at borders compared with the forms of control prior and after the border crossing. This share is declining due to the difficulty of distinguishing between internal and external origin of migrations, terrorism, economic and financial flows, software piracy and pollution.

In this context, border control is conceived and implemented in a selective and individualized manner. Seen in terms of risks, human, commercial and information flows become targets of surveillance, and border control becomes a form of risk management. Because these movements overflow the national space, security strategies now have to be conceived on a global scale and are heavily reliant on digital technologies that collect and store vast amounts of data about cross-border flows (Muller 2010; Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008).

The main objective of border security policies is not so much to stop these flows as it is to improve the mechanisms to filter and channel them. Consequently, borders are functioning today as firewalls, aiming to facilitate legitimate traffic while containing unwanted people and commodities perceived as security risks (Walters 2006). For example, borders could be very porous to capital, but not to workers with low levels of formal education. The implementation of this new logic of control has led to an unprecedented process of integration of technology-based surveillance systems, such as, biometrics, numeric and satellite networks, RFID, drones, robots, radars, CO2 detectors, and others, used to embed borders into bodies and flows in order to detect, identify and follow their movements. In this way, flows can be monitored continuously along their entire journey (Popescu 2011). The main rationale for this convergence is based on the misplaced belief that technological automation will, inevitably, strengthen border control capabilities by reducing enforcement costs and eliminating human error.

Following these developments, border security is more concerned with the prediction and the management of the effects of risks rather than with their actual causes. This logic is in accordance with neoliberal thinking that sees addressing the root causes of various issues as more costly than dealing with their effects (Agamben 2014). In addition, the “*datafication*” of human and goods mobility and practices, as well as the emergence of the “*bigdata*” paradigm, have further reduced the focus on causes and meanings of processes we observe. Given the amount of data that can be collected and processed by computers, it becomes easier to analyze an event and what is linked to it in order to find out regularities and probabilities, than to understand the factors determining it (Cukier and Mayer-Schönberger 2013). This shift of focus in border control practices and representations could explain the actual convergence of free trade policies on the one hand, and growing security control apparatus on the other.

### ~~Shifting Forms of Mobility and Changing Border Regimes~~

~~Keeping flows under surveillance today means that border controls managed by police, custom services and private companies get partially redeployed away from the formal state borderlines and inside the national territory as well as inside other states' territories. Customs may manage extraterritorial operations (Baldaccini 2010). Visa checks are carried out in the country of migrants' origin, not only in embassies but also in private offices (Infantino 2010). Simultaneously, check points are multiplied in order to track people and providers of goods who have managed to circumvent surveillance systems. Lastly, in order to exclude certain categories of flows, special zones such as detention centers, staging areas in airports, or free zones have been created on uncertain juridical basis (Bigo 1997; Rahola 2007; Bernardot 2009; Mountz~~




# Group themes and readings

Thursday, 24 September 2015

13:43

1. WALLS and FENCES
  - a. Wendy Brown
  - b. Setti
2. BORDER CROSSINGS / CROSSING BORDERS
  - a. Politics of border
  - b. STÉPHANE ROSIÈRE and Jones
  - c. Parizot et al
3. MIGRATION AS EVENT / IMMIGRATION AS SURVIVAL
  - a. Held
  - b. Molodikov
  - c. Silverstein
4. CONTROL AND SURVEILLANCE
  - a. Parizot et al
  - b. Setti
  - c. STÉPHANE ROSIÈRE and Jones
5. WAR, CONFLICT AND MIGRATION
  - Bennet (Thomas Demand)
  - Held

IN 2012, EXTREME WEATHER DROVE  
**MORE THAN 32 MILLION PEOPLE**  
FROM THEIR HOMES



98% OF CLIMATE REFUGEES WERE FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.



Source: Global Call for Climate Change, 2013


### The European Union and the Mediterranean migrant crisis: a case study

Migration from North Africa to Europe is certainly not new. For years the Mediterranean has been a thoroughfare for migrants trying to reach the shores of Europe. Whilst migrants have started their journeys from many African and Middle Eastern countries, they are typically bound by a common goal to find greater economic and social opportunities, escape persecution and flee conflict. However, there are notable differences in migration patterns over the last few years.

First, there has been a generalised increase of would-be-migrants attempting to reach Europe. Second, there has been a dramatic rise in the departures that travel via the Central Mediterranean route. In fact, the EU Border Agency, Frontex, estimates that between 2013 and 2014 there was a 277% increase (see figure 3). Third, and bearing in mind UNEP's projections for environmental refugees in Africa, the push from Africa is only likely to intensify in the

future.

Figure 3. Increase in migration flows, 2013-2014




Source: FRAN data in Frontex 2015a

Across the Mediterranean migration is increasing, but nowhere more dramatically than from Libya. From figures 4 and 5, one can see the apparent correlation between migration flows through the Central Mediterranean and the regional instability in North Africa. 2011 was a period of optimism and migration from Libya declined; but it has been exponentially rising since. The majority of the migrants are not Libyan per se. Rather, the greatest number of migrants to date have originated from Syria, Eritrea and Somalia, but there are significant numbers also from Nigeria, Gambia and Mali just to name a few. The instability and chaos that

grips Libya has created a vacuum for armed groups, smugglers, gangsters and human traffickers to operate at will; hence, Libya has become the dominant point of departure for many.

Figure 4. Fluctuations in popularity of routes to Europe




Source: Frontex in IOM 2014


Figure 5. Recent trends in and nationalities of illegal border crossovers

## Trend

### Quarterly detections of illegal border-crossing, 2014-2015



## Nationalities



Source: Frontex 2015b

The current Mediterranean migration crisis is in many respects a symptom of Western policy failures in two key respects. First, the failed intervention in Libya created the instability that led to the Central Mediterranean route becoming so popular as a passage to Europe. Second, the European countries scaled back recovery efforts just at a time when they were needed the most. From late 2013 to November/December 2014 the Italian government ran a relatively effective operation called Mare Nostrum, during which time more than 100,000 migrants were rescued at sea.

However, the operation was costly at €9 million a month, and Italy cancelled it at the end of 2014 claiming that it was unsustainable without more EU financial backing. In place of Mare Nostrum the EU launched the much-scaled back operation Triton. Under Mare Nostrum the Italian Navy carried out search and rescue operations across 27,000 miles of the Mediterranean. Under Triton, the mandate only covered border surveillance within 30 miles of the Italian coast. The EU budget for Triton was only a third of what was spent on Mare Nostrum. To those who paid attention at the time, this was a huge, bright, waving red flag. Human rights groups and migration experts warned, with virtual consensus, that this would lead to a much larger migration crisis with many more deaths in the Mediterranean.

In the face of renewed crisis (and many deaths) the EU initiated discussions about how to address the Mediterranean migrant dilemma. On the 29th of April 2015 the EU Council released its summary of their 28 country talks. The agenda moving forward can be summarised in three points: confront and prevent smugglers and human traffickers from operating; triple the financial resources for EU border operations including the increase of ships and other necessary capacity; and enhance refugee protection. For the latter, this includes implementing a 'Common European Asylum System to ensure the same standards in all Member States, an increase of emergency aid to front-line Member States, and the deployment of support teams to help process asylum claims' (European Council 2015).

This could have gone a long way towards mitigating the escalating tragedy in the Mediterranean. However, it would certainly be a mistake to consider the matter closed and problem solved, even if the EU were able to bring casualties to zero. Upon close inspection of the EU's plan, it is clear that it has continued to be driven primarily by an exclusionary regional interest to manage and control migration into Europe. These are policies that, whilst having a humanitarian veneer, radically exacerbate the burdens of migrants and displaced persons from and in countries like Libya, Syria, Eritrea, and Somalia. Stefan Kessler captures the underlying motive behind the EU's new approach: 'Keep protection-seekers far, far away from Europe so that their deaths don't make the headlines in European media' (in Siegfried 2015). Moreover, a conspicuous absence from this response is the increasing concern with climate-induced displacement and migratory flows. Instead, migration continues to be conceived through a security-specific lens, deliberately missing larger parts of the picture. But it is clear that the policy has failed both in its narrow objectives and in wider terms as migration flows put pressure on multiple entry points into Europe, from Macedonia to Italy, Greece to France. Some of these pressures have now become so great that these entry points are almost ungovernable. It remains to be seen how the interplay between state migration policy and actual migratory movements play out, with some countries, notably Germany and Sweden, currently liberalising their border policies, while others, the UK and Hungary for instance, are resisting such moves.

To be sure, these problems are difficult to resolve. The issue of refugees and displaced peoples is one of the great tests of the international humanitarian ideals of the 21st century, and of the cosmopolitan aspirations of a Europe shaped by ambition to project its soft power and good governance across the world. However, when cosmopolitanism meets state interests under economic pressure, the former is often cast aside. Europe, racked by the Euro crisis, has become a partial, and all too often sorrowful, champion of humanitarian values. There is a paradox wherein many European states are cosmopolitan when it comes to championing ideals, but remain sectarian when it comes to their implementation.

### **Concluding remarks**

The growing crisis of migration, as Pierre Hassner once wrote, “like the problem of genocide, or of the environment, or of nuclear proliferation, can be handled only by going beyond the monopoly of states toward a more universal perspective, such as that of human rights, or a more global one, such as that of a collective interest of the planet” (1998, p.281). As Hassner recognised, the question is whether “an effective synthesis of the global and the local, the universal and the particular” remains within the sphere of the possible (ibid.).

Stepping stones to a universal constitutional order, linking the global and the local, are, I have argued elsewhere, already in place, set down by some of the most important achievements of international law and institution building in the 20th century (see Held 2010). These developments generate a conception of rightful authority tied to human rights and democratic values. In this perspective, political power is legitimate, if, and only if, it upholds these standards. Moreover, the link between territory, sovereignty, and rightful authority, is, in principle, broken since rightful authority can be exercised in many spheres and many levels – local, subnational, national and supranational. Accordingly, citizenship can be envisaged, as it already is in the EU, as equal membership in the diverse, overlapping political communities, which uphold common civic political values and standards. Citizenship, accordingly, is not built on exclusive membership in a single community, but on a set of principles and legal arrangements which link people together in diverse communities which significantly affect them.

Stepping stones, yes. But it remains another big step to extend these principles and arrangements to the stateless. Short term extensions policies in the EU could include: centrally funded reception centres; coordinated legal routes through which migrants can travel safely to seek refuge; robust asylum quotas for all member states; tackling human trafficking; and providing direct aid to refugee camps in the Middle East which are currently home to millions of displaced people. Short term working visas and limited working passes are also among options to ease the crises of the stateless while offering universal hospitality in an era of overlapping communities of fate.

Even if this were granted (and we are a long way from this happening), the problem would only be stemmed – not resolved. Only when people live securely in a world where sustainable development is promoted in all regions, where severe inequalities between countries are tempered and reduced, and where a universal constitutional order guarantees the rights of all peoples, could this begin to be envisaged. Cosmopolitan ideals, but still, far from realities.



# The refugee crisis is waking old fears in central Europe

Irina Molodikova

Muslim migrants are finding little welcome in countries such as Hungary and Croatia

Sunday 20 September 2015 06.05 BST

The ethnic background of refugees has changed hugely over the past several decades. In the 1990s, after the fall of the iron curtain, most were Europeans, mostly Christian. Now most are Muslims from Asia and Africa.

Undoubtedly, the expansion of the European Union has increased its internal heterogeneity, but when the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, mentioned that Muslims are already part of the culture of many EU countries, these were words that were not given the same welcome in all countries.

Expansion of the EU eastwards meant an incorporation of countries whose values might not be entirely in line with the European “norm”. What we are seeing now is in part an expression of that tension, a need to balance the EU’s security interests on the one hand and the interests of the development of democracy and protection of human rights on the other.

The increasing numbers of people seeking asylum has thrown into the air a simple “progressive” development of Europe. Instead, the sometimes hostile reception given to migrants and refugees, the closing of borders, even the possibility of the exit of some countries from the Schengen agreement has taken us back into history, and in particular, the specific history of this part of the world.

Remember that the refugees are now flowing through the Balkan countries that, only 20 years ago, were the scene of inter-ethnic bloodshed. The Balkans had long been under the rule of the Ottoman empire and attitudes towards Muslims in many places are ambivalent, at best. (And the truth is that most countries in central and south-western Europe are, in turn, not attractive for asylum seekers, but are rather mere transit countries.)

Life in the Balkans might have changed substantially. But still fears of politicians reflect the fears of the population (and vice versa). The sudden arrival of large numbers of Muslim refugees does not make local people there happy. This is true also for



Hungary, which historically was under Turkish rule for about 150 years. Croatia has similar attitudes, perhaps remembering the story of their former compatriots from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo.

Let us also remember that during the Balkan wars in early 1990s Hungary opened its borders for its neighbours and adopted a large number of asylum seekers and refugees. Now the situation is different: Hungary, as well as its new EU neighbour Croatia, is closing its borders.

Another fearsome new factor for Hungary, which routinely was receiving about 2,000 asylum applications a year, is to suddenly find itself fielding the most asylum applications per million of population. In the second quarter of 2015 for Hungary the figure was 3,317 per million people, compared with Austria (2,026), Sweden (1,476) and Germany (997). In Croatia there were only six per million. The EU average was 26.

This new wave of migrants originates mostly from Syria (21%), Afghanistan (12%) and Iraq (6%), as well as Albania (8%) and Kosovo (5%).

Usually refugees fleeing for their lives head for their neighbouring countries, in the hope that they will be able to return home soon. Those countries usually have already respective diasporas who can come to the rescue. No one wants specifically, to risk their lives, if they know that they can get help just across the border.

I remember my visit to one of the Turkish refugee camps back in 2008, where they kept people who wanted to go to the EU, close to the border with Greece. The small cells were for 70 persons each, and three times a day they were given only bread and water. The Turkish officer asked: "Why do we have to keep these people and feed them if they want to go to the EU and do not want to stay here? Greek border guards, pushing them back to us." Little has changed since then.

For a long time, problems with the observance of the rights of refugees have been noted in all border countries. This has been discussed by EU experts and NGOs, but made little impact on the public. Now the secret has been revealed, the Balkan countries, including parts of the EU, have given up their role on protection.

Establishing quotas and strengthening borders does not look like the solution. Therefore it will be useful to have a system of collective responsibility for dealing with the crisis. It is necessary not only to provide humanitarian aid for those who are living in refugee camps but also to create a scheme of study and work for young people in troubled countries, to prepare their new elite.

According to the Gatestone institute, most who manage to come to the EU are young men aged 16-20 years. They make up 80% of all arrivals to Germany. Refugees are with us, and around us in the neighbouring countries. If we do not help them, we will marginalise them. And then - further down the line - they will follow those who promise them a better life and they will believe in it.

*Dr Irina Molodikova runs the Project on Migration and Security, Central European University, Budapest*

● *Comments will be opened later this morning*

More comment

## Topics

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Europe

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Hargreaves 1995; Hargreaves & McKinney 1997).

Ethnographies of postcolonial migration to Europe have increasingly focused on such avowals of hybridity as demonstrated within various immigrant social practices and cultural productions. The immigrant association, for instance, has become a privileged object of study both in terms of its serendipitous provision of access for fieldworkers to otherwise dispersed and invisible communities [Diouf 2002, pp. 149–52; Silverstein 2004, pp. 11–13; Suárez-Navas 2004; on the subject of migrant (in)visibility in relation to questions of illegality and deportability, see also De Genova 2001, Haddad & Smith 2002, Kearney 1986, MacGaffey & Bazenguissa-Ganga 2000, Smith 2003, Ticktin 2002] and also in terms of its salience as spaces of immigrant articulation and response to larger racialized ideologies and institutions (Grillo 1985, Rex et al. 1987). Such work has likewise focused on the various media productions and instantiation of multicultural difference, from Turkish news media in Amsterdam (Ogan 2001) to Algerian community radio in France (Derderian 2004), to the black British and Franco-Maghrebi production of reggae and rap music (Gilroy 1987, Gross et al. 1994). These works bear witness to how larger anthropological assessments of a “world in creolisation” (Hannerz 1987) can be similarly discovered in de facto “creolized” nation-states like France (Beriss 2004, pp. 132–33). In these ways, through state anxiety, sociological description, immigrant avowal, anthropological celebration, and corporate commodification, the postcolonial, second-generation immigrant in Europe becomes a racialized vector for the study of multiculturalism and global cosmopolitanism.



## The Transmigrant

Governmental concerns over the failure of immigrant cultural assimilation in Europe—particularly since the spread of Middle Eastern conflicts from Algeria, Lebanon,

Palestine, and Turkey to Europe beginning in the mid-1980s and the social dramas overveiling in France since 1989—have been translated into larger fears over the transnationality of European Muslims, over the nature of Euro-Islam (whether it is an Islam of Europe or simply an Islam in Europe) and its implication for the future of national loyalty and participatory citizenship in European national polities (see Cesari 1998, 2004; Kepel 1991, 1997; Lamchichi 1999; Leveau et al. 2002; Lewis & Schnapper 1994; Roy 2004). Lewis (1994), for one, in his introduction to a collection on *Muslims in Europe*, contributes directly to the essentialization of Euro-Muslims as part of a singular, ahistorical Islamic world, reading back current internal debates and struggles over the adoption of Muslim practices in the European context as contemporary expressions of timeless theological debates over the meaning of *hijra* (migration). He ends the essay by recounting his surprise when meeting a Franco-Maghrebi, who explained to him, “My father was a Muslim, but I am a Parisian” (p. 18). Rather than seeing in this opposition a polysemous flexibility in the meaning of religious and geographic categories, he concludes by positing a conflict between the two irreconcilable ideological poles (compare Lewis 1990). Such postulations of a trans-historical civilizational clash point to larger national anxieties over the uncontrolled and uncontrollable penetration of the nation-state by transnational ethnic and religious movements originating from and ideologically tied to abroad.

In many ways, scholars like Lewis have contributed to the racialization of certain immigrant groups (and Muslims in particular) as preternaturally transnational, with enduring cultural orientations to homelands elsewhere. To a great extent, this focus of European migration studies indexes the decline of economic and sociological analyses of migration in favor of anthropological and political science models of diasporas, globalization, and transnationalism (see Kearney 1995 for a review of this literature). In particular, the

adoption of world systems approaches into mainstream political science challenged the ability to characterize migrations as a uni-directional flow between one nation-state and another. Instead, postnational solidarities, based on ethnicity, race, or religion, were constituted as the cultural political organization of the future. Migrants, and transmigrants in particular, have become largely iconic of such a world in which state and national boundaries are traversed by various social networks and scapes (Glick Schiller 1999; compare Appadurai 1996).

Within European migration studies, a transnational reality was asserted as early as 1981 in the formulation a “new paradigm,” in which mobility and transformation were reinterpreted as the natural state of human civilization (Kubat & Nowotony 1981). French researchers, for instance, began to question whether migratory flows were not spelling out “the end of the national” and the beginning of the “transnational” (Catani 1986) and began to explore the links between immigration and international relations (Badie 1995, Badie & Wihtol de Wenden 1994). In recent years, ethnographers have provocatively explored the ways in which various kinds of cultural and religious spaces were being mapped out in European geographies through ritualized enactments of Caribbean carnival (Cohen 1993) or Sufi processions that “sacralize alien cityscapes” (Werbner 1996, p. 310; see also Carter 1997, Mandel 1996, Metcalf 1996). These processes are central to the ways in which transnational spheres, linking Pakistan and Britain, Senegal and Italy, Algeria and France, Turkey and Germany, are constituted, leading researchers to embrace neologisms like “*Deutschkei*” (a German union of *Deutschland* and *Türkei*) (Argun 2003, p. 6) or “*Touba Turin*” (Carter 1997, p. 55) as the most adequate toponyms to describe these new trans-state entities (see also White 1997).

However, such a focus on “transpolitics” (Silverstein 2004) and its relation to migration has never been purely an academic concern.

Indeed, like the World Bank’s 1983 Integrated Computer-Based Manpower Forecasting Model discussed above, international bodies such as the ILO and the OECD have sought to develop more sophisticated and comprehensive models to account for the decreasing national framework of migration patterns and for approaching the new migrant-as-nomad theory (compare Kritiz et al. 1992). In the new model, multinational corporations, regional bodies (such as the European Union), and autonomous social networks come to represent competing players for which previous state-centered theories, employed in the past, can no longer account. Such a state-level adoption of a transnational perspective must therefore be viewed as part of a larger effort to support national formations understood as threatened, particularly in the context of immigrant communities that deploy burgeoning supranational institutions and legal regimes to argue for cultural and linguistic rights in the European societies in which they live (Kastoryano 1994, 2002; Soysal 1994). More generally, in approaching Muslim immigrants and their children as transmigrants—as participating directly in a border-defying form of global Islam—European states construct an ultimate abject people, a problem not simply solvable through national integration policies. In outlining such an abject relation, migration studies and state policy collude in the representation of migrants as effectively occupying a newly exoticized and racialized savage slot.

## CONCLUSION

The above genealogy of different racializations of migrants indicates the dialectical relationship between state racial formations and migration studies. Successive and overlapping racial categories of nomad, laborer, uprooted victim, hybrid, and transmigrant reflect not only transformations in scholars’ analytical tools but different articulations of global capital and national formations in colonial and postcolonial contexts.

Although the particular characteristics attributed to migrant populations have changed with each discursive shift, what remains constant is that the incipient mobility of immigrants, within the context of a European nation-state system based historically on the fixity of spatial and cultural borders [itself under threat by processes of Europeanization (Borneman & Fowler 1997)], constitutes them as a racial problem that states, scholars, and immigrant populations themselves have been compelled to address. In this respect, citizenship and multicultural policies in Europe remain the privileged contemporary sites where such problems are expressed and debated, and it is of little wonder that these areas have attracted so much recent ethnographic attention (Amselle 2003, Bauman 1996, Beriss 2004, Holmes 2000, Kastoryano 2002, Shukla 2003, Suárez-Navaz 2004, Werbner 2002, Wikan 2002).

It is tempting to conclude this review pessimistically, seeing racialization as essentially a process of the state disciplining immigrant difference and mobility into commensurable citizens and commodifiable cultures. However, one must not forget that such racial

categorization is itself productive, the condition of possibility for immigrant solidarity in and across cultural lines. It is certainly true that the histories of immigration, capital, and race have often divided diasporic and immigrant populations, producing Little Indias (Axel 2001, Shukla 2003), Arab Frances (McMurray 1997), Senegalese Turins (Carter 1997), and Turkish Colognes (Clark 1977; compare Argun 2003, p. 9); that working-class racism (Balibar 1991) and late capitalist uncertainties continue to construct migrants as “alien-nations” semantically allied with zombies and other uncontrollable monstrous forces (Comaroff & Comaroff 1999). Nevertheless, these racializations are never fixed, and crossings across racial frontiers are, in many settings, as much the norm as the exception (compare Palumbo-Liu 1999, Rampton 1995). Such crossings are the condition of possibility for solidarity (Prashad 2000), for a “new *convivencia* (living-together)” (Suárez-Navaz 2004, pp. 191–220), and it is the task of an anthropology of the present to explore the cultural conditions of not just disjuncture and difference, but also of conjuncture and convergence.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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# Group themes and readings

Thursday, 24 September 2015

13:43

1. WALLS and FENCES
  - a. Wendy Brown
  - b. Setti
2. BORDER CROSSINGS / CROSSING BORDERS
  - a. Politics of border
  - b. STÉPHANE ROSIÈRE and Jones
  - c. Parizot et al
3. MIGRATION AS EVENT / IMMIGRATION AS SURVIVAL
  - a. Held
  - b. Molodikov
  - c. Silverstein
4. CONTROL AND SURVEILLANCE
  - a. Parizot et al
  - b. Setti
  - c. STÉPHANE ROSIÈRE and Jones
5. WAR, CONFLICT AND MIGRATION
  - Bennet (Thomas Demand)
  - Held

Crossing borders, people and goods have to pass through multiple networks and complex identification devices. Making sense of these mutations requires sustained in-depth analysis as well as a wide range of modes of inquiry, critical methodologies, and interdisciplinary engagements, that can open the path for creative research (Van Houtum, Kramsch, and Ziefhofer 2004; Rumford 2007; Wastl-Walter 2012, Wilson and Donnan 2012).

While atlases express stability, or rather give the illusion of it, the *antiAtlas* wishes to reintroduce borders' dynamic nature and complex manifestations, and to provide a critical approach to border representations. We assert that systematic graphic visualization of space is neither the most acceptable nor the most desirable way of understanding borders. This does not mean that we disqualify the traditional map, as we do not contest the usefulness of maps as knowledge tools. What we claim is that maps' systematic compiling does not provide an adequate understanding of the complexity of borders. Maps are not only political but also epistemological devices. They are not simply representations of territories and borders, but they also contribute to their production. Border making is intrinsically linked to map drawing, as maps make the border conceptually as well as practically possible. Maps are models that determine the forms of their production and lay the conditions to produce relations in space.

The study of territorial shape is less essential today than examining borders' physical inertia, their contextual materialization and dematerialization, as well as their social construction and highly technological nature. Increasingly, borders appear as evolving devices with electronic and biological characteristics that function as bases for mobile control and surveillance. At the same time, they shape exchanges, generate formal and informal rules, and produce random definitions of what is legitimate and what is not. What is at stake, thus, is to understand the border as a perpetually changing process, using an alternative set of representations that do not reify power positions the way atlases do. In this sense, we prefer the path of multiple investigations to unearth the multifaceted nature of border-making processes. Beyond their topography, borders address sociological, psychological, anthropological and ontological issues. This means that we need to pay attention at the same time to their locations, forms and shapes, as well as to their modes of existence, constitutive processes and imaginaries.



### **From Territorial Control to Flows and Risk Management**

The transformation of borders is intimately connected to the ways globalization has altered spatial interactions of all kinds, such as production chains, communication and defense systems, work and culture (Appadurai 1996). Freedom of mobility has been conceived through an economic perspective (Peck 2010; Amable 2011). Contemporary public policies that are usually qualified as “neoliberal” have been over-discussed and reinterpreted (Hilgers 2012), but it is widely admitted that they have promoted national reforms that include “free trade” and labor flexibility (Jacoby 2008, 2011), while promoting altogether on a global scale accounting standards (Mattli and Büthe 2005; Richardson and Eberlein 2011), banking prudential norms (Goodhart 2011; Young 2012), and fiscal consolidation (Kleinbard 2012; Blanchard and Leigh 2013; Hebous and Zimmermann 2013). At the same time, there are new strategies which aim at containing migratory pressures through the selective filtering of human flows (Shamir 2005).

These transformations have resulted in a contradiction between economic practices that increase unequal global development and the need to implement sustainable and fair global development (Sassen 2008). There is also a gap between national governments' policies, which are limited by their sovereignty, and the need to regulate transnational processes through global governance frameworks (Kramsch and Hooper 2004; Ba and Hoffmann 2005).

To address these contradictions, national governments have assigned state borders the function to guarantee people's security in a world characterized by transnational mobility of people, capital, goods and ideas. In other words, borders are supposed to allow a high level of mobility while protecting against social, economic, political, and public health risks the mobility of people generate.

While state borders are clearly more and more represented as legally intangible, it becomes increasingly problematic both for analytical purposes (Steinberg 2009; Johnson, Jones et al. 2011) and in terms of securitization (Brunet-Jailly 2007) to locate the border control within specific and stable places. The lines between domestic and external security have become blurred to such an extent that these domains are difficult to separate clearly. Yet, the role of borders does not decline. What is declining is the relative share of controls implemented at borders compared with the forms of control prior and after the border crossing. This share is declining due to the difficulty of distinguishing between internal and external origin of migrations, terrorism, economic and financial flows, software piracy and pollution.

In this context, border control is conceived and implemented in a selective and individualized manner. Seen in terms of risks, human, commercial and information flows become targets of surveillance, and border control becomes a form of risk management. Because these movements overflow the national space, security strategies now have to be conceived on a global scale and are heavily reliant on digital technologies that collect and store vast amounts of data about cross-border flows (Muller 2010; Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008).

The main objective of border security policies is not so much to stop these flows as it is to improve the mechanisms to filter and channel them. Consequently, borders are functioning today as firewalls, aiming to facilitate legitimate traffic while containing unwanted people and commodities perceived as security risks (Walters 2006). For example, borders could be very porous to capital, but not to workers with low levels of formal education. The implementation of this new logic of control has led to an unprecedented process of integration of technology-based surveillance systems, such as, biometrics, numeric and satellite networks, RFID, drones, robots, radars, CO2 detectors, and others, used to embed borders into bodies and flows in order to detect, identify and follow their movements. In this way, flows can be monitored continuously along their entire journey (Popescu 2011). The main rationale for this convergence is based on the misplaced belief that technological automation will, inevitably, strengthen border control capabilities by reducing enforcement costs and eliminating human error.

Following these developments, border security is more concerned with the prediction and the management of the effects of risks rather than with their actual causes. This logic is in accordance with neoliberal thinking that sees addressing the root causes of various issues as more costly than dealing with their effects (Agamben 2014). In addition, the “*datafication*” of human and goods mobility and practices, as well as the emergence of the “*bigdata*” paradigm, have further reduced the focus on causes and meanings of processes we observe. Given the amount of data that can be collected and processed by computers, it becomes easier to analyze an event and what is linked to it in order to find out regularities and probabilities, than to understand the factors determining it (Cukier and Mayer-Schönberger 2013). This shift of focus in border control practices and representations could explain the actual convergence of free trade policies on the one hand, and growing security control apparatus on the other.

### ~~Shifting Forms of Mobility and Changing Border Regimes~~

~~Keeping flows under surveillance today means that border controls managed by police, custom services and private companies get partially redeployed away from the formal state borderlines and inside the national territory as well as inside other states' territories. Customs may manage extraterritorial operations (Baldaccini 2010). Visa checks are carried out in the country of migrants' origin, not only in embassies but also in private offices (Infantino 2010). Simultaneously, check points are multiplied in order to track people and providers of goods who have managed to circumvent surveillance systems. Lastly, in order to exclude certain categories of flows, special zones such as detention centers, staging areas in airports, or free zones have been created on uncertain juridical basis (Bigo 1997; Rahola 2007; Bernardot 2009; Mountz~~



# Teichopolitics: Re-considering Globalisation Through the Role of Walls and Fences

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
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*This article considers the trend in many countries towards securitised immigration policies and “hardening” of borders through the construction of walls or fences. In contrast the borderless world of globalisation, it identifies these attempts to strengthen control of borders as teichopolitics: the politics of building barriers. This article analyses the different types of hardened borders that exist today and proposes a typology of frontlines, fences/walls, and closed straights. Then the article maps the locations of these barriers and argues that although other justifications ranging from smuggling to terrorism are often put forward, these barriers are mostly connected with managing immigration flows. Indeed, many of these barriers are located on important economic or social discontinuity lines, precisely where the system reveals its underlying logics. These walls and fences symbolise the emergence of a privileged few who actually live the promise of globalisation and defend its privileges through teichopolitics.*

This view, of course, was proven correct. Far from the optimistic representations of many scholars, the contemporary world is characterised by the increasing enclosure of territories *between* sovereign states through the construction of walls and fences on international borders and *within* sovereign states through the development of various methods of sustaining inequality such as gated communities. Even beyond the construction of physical barriers, this reality is underlined through new restrictive immigration laws that have been put in place around the world from Italy to the United States.<sup>4</sup> Rather than welcoming flows of people, these symbolic and physical barriers institutionalise privilege through legal exclusions and the blunt force of barriers.<sup>5</sup>

In order to conceptualise this new paradigm of long stretches of closed borders and the hardening of crossing points this article introduces the term *teichopolitics*. This neologism, coined by Ballif and Rosière (2009), is linked to notions of biopolitics and biopower proposed by the French philosopher Michel Foucault. These connected notions refer mainly to the practice of modern states and their regulation of individual lives and populations through “an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugations of bodies and the control of populations.”<sup>13</sup> In the case of teichopolitics, biopower is manifested in the denial of the right to move although this right is proclaimed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.<sup>14</sup>

The word teichopolitics is coined from the ancient Greek word *τειχος* (*teichos*) meaning “city wall”. Teichopolitics is, in short, the politics of building barriers on borders for various security purposes. The next section



**FIGURE 1** Border barriers: A world map (color figure available online).

Source: Habiter laboratory, 2010.

## TYOLOGY OF BORDER BARRIERS

Teichopolitics is not simply about building walls or fences. Instead, it encompasses the whole range of barriers that limit the movement of people and goods across borders including administrative measures and military installations which often support the barriers. Here we consider four types of border closure, which together capture the broader trend towards securitised borders.

### Frontline

The first type of closure border refers back to the older military purpose of boundaries and is characterised by the existence of an empty space (no man's land [*sic*]) separating two zones of military installations. This type of border closure has become increasingly rare as the vast majority of states have been integrated into the sovereign state system and have joined the UN which condemns the use of force in bilateral relations.<sup>24</sup> Most of the contemporary frontlines were primarily erected during the Cold War period and have been in place for many years. They often mark a disputed area

**TABLE 1** World border barriers: Location, length and typology (all lengths in kilometres)

| Country 1  | Country 2                         | Walls-fences | Front lines |
|--|-----------------------------------|--------------|-------------|
| <b>World Border Barriers</b> (alphabetically, with name of decision-maker first) |                                   |              |             |
| Abkhazia   | Georgia                           |              | 80          |
| Botswana   | Zimbabwe                          | 813          |             |
| Brunei   | Malaysia                          | 21           |             |
| China  | North Korea                       | 1416         |             |
| Cyprus (green line)  |                                   |              | 180         |
| Ethiopia   | Eretria                           |              | 912         |
| European Union (Schengen area)   | Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova | 4278         |             |
| Greece   | Turkey                            | 206          |             |
| India  | Bangladesh                        | 4053         |             |
| India  | Pakistan (Line of Control)        |              | 740         |
| India  | Pakistan (without LOC)            | 2172         |             |
| Iraq (US administration)   | Jordan                            | 238          |             |
| Iraq (US administration)   | Syria                             | 605          |             |
| Iran   | Pakistan                          | 909          |             |
| Israel   | West Bank                         | 785          |             |
| Israel   | Gaza strip                        | 51           |             |
| Israel   | Egypt                             | 266          |             |
| Israel   | Jordan                            | 238          |             |
| Israel   | Lebanon                           | 79           |             |
| Israel   | Syria                             |              | 76          |
| Karabakh   | Azerbaijan                        |              | 220         |
| Kazakhstan   | China                             | 1533         |             |
| Korean DMZ   |                                   |              | 239         |
| Kuwait   | Iraq                              | 240          |             |
| Morocco 'sand wall'  |                                   |              | 2720        |
| Russia   | North Korea                       | 19           |             |
| Saudi Arabia   | Iraq                              | 814          |             |
| Saudi Arabia   | UAE                               | 457          |             |
| Saudi Arabia   | Yemen                             | 1458         |             |
| South Africa   | Mozambique                        | 491          |             |
| South Africa   | Zimbabwe                          | 225          |             |
| South Ossetia  | Georgia                           |              | 100         |
| Spain  | Morocco                           | 17           |             |
| Syria  | Turkey                            | 818          |             |
| Thailand   | Malaysia                          | 506          |             |
| Turkey   | Armenia                           | 267          |             |
| United Arab Emirates (UAE)   | Oman                              | 410          |             |
| United States  | Mexico                            | 3140         |             |
| Uzbekistan   | Kyrgyzstan                        | 1099         |             |
| subtotal   |                                   | 27624        | 5267        |
| total  |                                   |              | 32 891      |
| %  |                                   | 83.9         | 13.1        |

where two states continue to claim territory on the other side and a peace treaty has not yet been negotiated (Korea, Cyprus, Israel/Palestine, Kashmir). The longest example of a frontline is in Western Sahara where Morocco built 2,700 km of fortified sand walls, which represent 51.6 percent of existing frontline on Earth. Nevertheless, frontlines still represent roughly 13 percent of hardened borders in the world (Figure 2).

| TYPE                   | FENCE              | WALL         | FRONT                         | CLOSED STRAITS            |
|------------------------|--------------------|--------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------|
| Spatial organisation   |                    |              |                               |                           |
| Barrier Morphology     | Fence              | Wall         | No man's land and front lines | Sea                       |
| Cross-border relations | Low to high        | Low to high  | Null (or low)                 | Low to high               |
| Examples               | Kazakhstan / China | USA / Mexico | Kashmir (India/Pakistan)      | Gibraltar (Marocco/Spain) |

### Legend :

|  |                        |  |                     |
|--|------------------------|--|---------------------|
|  | International boundary |  | Low density region  |
|  | Fence                  |  | No man's land / Sea |
|  | Wall                   |  | Military settlement |
|  | Synapse / gate road    |  | Town                |
|  |                        |  | Flows               |

Realisation : S. Rosière  
Cartography : Plantoni - 2009

FIGURE 2 Types of border-barriers.

## Fences and Walls

The second and third types of barriers are fences and walls, which are the most emblematic artifacts of teichopolitics. Despite the stigma associated with building walls after the construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961, since 2000 many countries around the world have initiated or expanded these barriers (Figure 1 and Table 1). In most cases, the barriers had been under consideration for some time and the underlying cause was often immigration, smuggling, or defining the state's population or territory. However, the overt justifications often revolve around the immediate threat open borders pose in terms of terrorism and security.<sup>26</sup> In total, fences and walls represent roughly 87 percent of contemporary terrestrial border barriers.

## Closed Straights

The final type of border barrier is the closed (or hardened) maritime strait. This kind of barrier is often forgotten by scholars but is very important for the purpose of controlling undesired migration flows. Straits are hardened if they coincide with strong wealth or political discontinuities (developed/less developed countries or free country/dictatorship) and are characterised by important undesired immigration flows. Examples include the Strait of Florida between the West Indies and the USA, the Gibraltar strait between North Africa and the EU or the Arafura and Timor seas between Indonesia and Australia). Such straits consist of a virtual fence implemented on the immigration side (the wealthy coast) and are organised around control towers to which various alarm systems, satellite, radar, and airplane reconnaissance are connected. These systems aim to detect the arrival of unauthorised boats and allow police vessels to be deployed to intercept them before they make landfall.



## A STRICT HIERARCHY OF FLOWS

Mobility is an increasingly paradoxical dimension of our societies. Communication and trade implicate flows, and flows are not only an aspect of globalisation but the *sine qua none* of its existence. They are supposed to reveal the dynamism of the global economy and signify the transnational age. Transnational corporations rely heavily on these connections and international organisations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) promote global trade by easing the movement of particular types of goods and people. At the same time, global flows remain the nightmare of governments, administrations, and security agencies, as the expansion of the world economy produces extreme imbalances of power and wealth. The border barriers of teichopolitics are therefore instructive because they demonstrate that all mobilities and flows are not valued, but rather that globalisation implies a strict hierarchy of flows which can easily be sketched. Financial

# Migrants' Art and Writings

## Figures of Precarious Hospitality

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**ABSTRACT** Time, precarious lives and memories and multiple narrations related to crossing borders constitute the key meanings of a series of contemporary pieces of works produced by migrant artists and writers (Tarek Al-Ghoussein, Marwan Rechmaoui, Jumana Emil Abboud and Hoda Barakat). Through an analysis of some of their works, this article focuses on some spatio-temporal images, actions and metaphors related to movement (crossing, walking through, passing borders). Then it questions the exploration of narratives in visual arts, especially the relationship between imaginary fiction and reality stories. Theatre may become the very place where contemporary tales of migrant people are translated, (re)told, performed. The very meaningful notion of hospitality becomes a theatrical practice in one of the most relevant spectacles of the Théâtre du Soleil, *Le Dernier Caravansérail (Odysées)* (2003). Another aspect of this creative hospitality – Leïla Sebbar's *Mes Algéries en France* – concerns the interweaving of memories belonging to opposite sides of divided countries, after the colonial wars. This work of collection, transcription, translation from one to another gives an example of writing (as fiction and narrative) as a repairing work but also of revelation of unknown connections.

**KEY WORDS** contemporary fiction ♦ hospitality ♦ migrant writers ♦ postcolonial memories ♦ temporality ♦ theatre ♦ visual arts

Nowadays, we have a view of our world as a planetary map crossed all over by many trajectories: those of products of the world market, those of migrant streams from South to North, from East to West (itineraries and directions change from region to region, in different periods). This kind of map varies quite often so that the representation of the world space is related to a changing time. It is a time of displacement, migrations, travels and transfers of merchandise or individuals, images, words. Postcolonial or neocolonial wars bring about the migration of entire populations, native and sedentary people become nomadic, citizens of one country become strangers, exiled, refugees, *sans papiers*, in other countries,

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<http://ejw.sagepub.com>

where they are obliged to hold identity papers to be able to show the police and authorities. The decolonization process is followed by the globalization era where new forms of colonization emerge.

So the experience of being a stranger, an outsider, is much more common, is even an essential part of our human experience in these times. Border-crossing can be an ordinary act without consequences (study, business, tourist journeys) or an act of survival for those who leave their homes to escape disease, war and poverty. These migrants become neighbours, work colleagues, schoolmates of those who never had to leave. In our daily life we may cross in public or private space, as well as on web logs, people whose language and culture are completely or quite different from ours. These experiences lead to a rethinking of hospitality beyond the private space, into an enlarged, public and globalized one.

My first question is: how do artists and writers inscribe within their work this moving space and time, its instability and actuality? How do the visual arts, texts and theatre performances speak to us of these migrant itineraries and of the language of hospitality?

Since our world is a variable one, most contemporary artists choose materials and artistic forms typical of performance art (photos, videos, movies, electrical engines, mobiles). Since space keeps changing, images as texts cannot be fixed, but they transform themselves in time: for example, they circulate online, in a space whose limits are incalculable and then potentially without limits. If the idea of border implies a spatial representation, these works produce temporal representations on a world scale. Many texts stem from a strong feeling of fading origins and memories, of the fragility of ephemeral houses, from the consciousness of a loss of memory, of one's mother tongue and of one's collective and personal history. Politically engaged artists in the global and local context cross-examine the limits/borders between the fictional and the real world, especially when reality is characterized by war or economic disasters.

## (IN)VISIBLE BORDERS

The image chosen for the exhibition *Scènes du Sud II Méditerranée orientale*<sup>1</sup> is a tent in a desert, its blue covering suspended in the air, so that you cannot say if the tent is being put up or taken down. The photo catches a moment between two periods, before/after. It is an unfixed habitation, of

being in-between an arrival, a stay and a departure. The Palestinian artist Tarek Al-Ghoussein exhibits a series of photos printed on silk: they hang down from the ceiling so that visitors can walk among them, and see each one from either side. Visitors can invent various possible itineraries but they are never in a frontal and static position of voyeur/spectator; they can move around, between, up and down, looking at each photo from multiple angles. We find the idea of crossing in another piece of work, by the Lebanese artist Marwan Rechmaoui: his *Beirut Caoutchouc* (Rubber Beirut) is a large-scale reproduction of the map of Beirut, but there are no topographical indications, no names appear on the black map. The map is on the ground and visitors to the exhibition can walk on it. Visitors are there incognito, without name or identity: they are only characters in an imaginary space, in a temporary space and time (the exhibition). These crossings through the map leave almost imperceptible marks. So borders, frontiers, are entirely fictional: nothing allows us to distinguish this plan from that of any other town in the world. It is made of the same material as rubber-soled shoes: striding along and pacing over it, visitors use it, ruin it, mark it with their footsteps. Cuts become visible: frontiers are like cuts/breaks/fault lines that can end in the disintegration of the plan/town/work. This is especially meaningful precisely because it concerns Beirut, a town divided into many sectors, each self-contained and clearly delimited, so that to pass from one to the other passports must be shown at checkpoints, visible marks of internal frontiers that are not inscribed on the rubber map. Moreover visitors come to realize that their going through Beirut is a symbolic crossing, a fiction; where one moves between this piece of artwork in the exhibition and the real town, with its historical and cultural context. The transformation of a visitor into an active agent is the political element of this aesthetic proposition.

## THEATRE AND THE ART OF HOSPITALITY

The Persian *caravanserai* is a type of hostel built to accommodate entire caravans, with a yard and warehouses for animals and merchandise, and rooms for people. Do caravans still exist in our times? The play performed between 2003 and 2006 by the troupe of the Théâtre du Soleil, *Le Dernier Caravansérail (Odyssées)*, certainly deserves this name. The title and the realization of this spectacle perfectly signify the company's deep aesthetic, political and ethic vocation from its foundation in the 1970s. This is why it is such an essential reference in the itinerary I propose, in two fundamental

ways: being an example of modern hospitality, a space of collective and individual creation where everyone creates (oneself) in relation to the other(s); and since the way each actor/actress works is always open, always receptive to the other (character /performer/text), hospitality is mutual. As Hélène Cixous remarks in the programme of the spectacle:

Who are those refugees that our actors receive into their soul and their bodies? Who rest for a short ephemeral time in one or another caravanserai, who are those who receive our actors in their memory and destiny? . . . Ulysses is nowadays without name and without return. (Théâtre du Soleil, 2003)

The play is based on the transcription, assemblage and rewriting of several tales heard by the actors during the company's many travels around the world. Tales of true stories: some of them are those of the actors of the troupe, many others were refugees and *sans papiers*, *clandestins*, illegal immigrants living in the so-called *centre d'accueil* of Sangatte, others came from far away countries of the Middle East (Iran, Afghanistan) or the Southern hemisphere (Australia) or Eastern Europe (Russia, Chechnya). As one can easily imagine, the very history of our globalized world can be retraced in these tales. Instead of a printed play script (as is the case for other performances by the company), there is a kind of notebook where are registered the dates and encounters, the remarks of those who have told their stories, to those who have listened to them. Maps of their journeys are reproduced, often the same of contemporary migrations. Essential words in the vocabulary of a globalized world – refugee, hospitality, exile – are explained, documents reproduced, sentences written on the walls of Sangatte, recorded, translated and transcribed. One realizes the political impact of each of these gestures; and these clandestine and passing lives, persons and stories are given a time and space of existence, during the ephemeral space–time of the theatre. There, all of them can feel at home, they are *chez soi*. Even if they are considered *sans papiers*, without an identity card, they each have their names, origins, languages, dates, memories, places. At the very beginning of the play there is a scene that is emblematic of the theme of this issue of *EJWS*: a group of men, women and children try desperately to cross a river in turmoil, at the risk of drowning in its turbulent waters. Crossing borders is not without danger, these people jeopardize their lives in order to get to the other side. Unfortunately, this side is often a place like Sangatte, where people are imprisoned in an enclosed territory just because they have no identity cards (most of them have deliberately destroyed or thrown away their passports when passing the frontiers).

Of course, Sangatte is the example and the metaphor of conditional hospitality of a state deciding through its laws who will be admitted and who will not. This could eventually avoid the collision between the traditional law of hospitality and power that Derrida analyses:

This collision, it's also power in its finitude, that is the necessity, for the host, of choosing, electing, filtering, selecting guests and visitors, those who will be granted asylum, who will be given the right of visiting and getting hospitality. There is no hospitality, in its classical sense, without the sovereignty of the self in one's own home, but since there is no hospitality without finitude, this sovereignty can be exercised only by filtering and choosing, that is to say by the violence of exclusion. (Derrida and Dufourmantelle, 1997: 53)

But what does it mean being at home in a theatre during a performance? For the actors? In a modern *caravanserai*? One has to imagine an extra-territorial space where each one is at the same time an insider and an outsider, known and unknown, all differently a stranger at home. This play by the Théâtre du Soleil enriches the meaning of habitation, hospitality, outsider, stranger: one can be (wel)come to the performance without having to give one's name at the entrance, without stating one's identity. The power of the nation-state's laws to control entries and departures can be suspended in the theatrical space. In no way can this space become a territory with defined and exclusive – meaning controlled – borders. Moreover, even the stage is mobile, and this is another very effective metaphor of these tragic migrant stories: actors but also houses, rooms, tents, hospitals, shift across the stage (arrivals, departures). Habitations are temporary structures as persons can't stay in the same space for long, they cannot put down roots or build foundations. *Clandestins*, migrants cannot even touch the ground (the stage): each 'ground' is only a temporary one; only very few succeed in settling somewhere for any length of time. But on the stage there is a visible border, just in front of the spectators: a high wire netting and just in the middle a large rip through which migrants try continuously to pass. Almost all the scenes of *Sangatte* are attempts to cross the frontier and get to England. The word 'contemporary' is never more meaningful than on this stage, with its alternating scenes of what happens 'at the same time' in Iran, Afghanistan, France, Australia, Russia, England; through the stage, on the stage, all these migrant voices, languages and cultures communicate, and the public is both spectator and witness. Present time is necessarily a presence together, that allows one to be near, listening to their life tales, which happened elsewhere but are played here and now because of the hospitality of theatre. This community of presence (co-presence) make us conscious of the modern frontiers (wire fences, gates and walls); crossing them is an act of survival, not only an exchange or a simple getting through.

## PERFORMING BORDER-CROSSING

This dramatization of crossing borders returns in a performing artistic project by the Palestinian artist Jumana Emil Abboud. The stage is a 'real' one:



the land between Jerusalem and Ramallah. In a short text on the website *LiminalSpaces*, Abboud proposed her project *Smuggling Lemons*: the initial idea is to transport a lemon tree to the other side of the frontier, but this being almost impossible, because of the checkpoints, she imagines other ways of transportation and crossing. At every stage of the project there is a trespassing of territorial and property laws: to get the lemons she has to steal them in a garden enclosed by a gate, then she has to conceal them in a bag or a belt, finally she will transform them into lemonade in order to destroy the evidence of smuggling. Many aspects of this performance story are interesting for our theme: the development of the metaphor of putting down roots and of uprooting (of a lemon tree, of people living in-between), but even if we know that the uprooting of a tree and its transportation are possible, in her story Abboud chooses the transportation of fruits, the tree is not eradicated but parts of it can cross the frontier many times. The artist, a woman, carries them: her body has a very important function of container for the clandestine fruits to pass through the checkpoint. She is a migrant, a stranger, a smuggler but at the same time she is the site of hospitality. So the shift from carrying lemons to carrying her own daughter is not astonishing: she carries both in her arms, inside and outside her clothed body (lemons are concealed to pass the border). This artist, not only writes her piece, but, as the actors and actresses on a stage, performs it in different ways and engages her own body in it, as a woman and a mother, that means that in this case, gender is an essential element in the border crossing:

I want to smuggle lemons from Jerusalem to Ramallah. That's all. An entire lemon tree actually, but since I cannot technically carry an entire tree in my bag, I will make do with the lemons themselves. *Smuggling Lemons* is a project that has several components: a video work, an installation of the smuggled lemons, and a performance involving a lemonade stand that will take place at the completion of the project in order to eliminate all evidence of the smuggling operation. One can visualize a scenario in which an individual is awarded back the lemon tree from the very garden where the house he lost once stood. He may naively imagine that his loss of the house was due simply to geographical disorientation, or to a mistake made in the process of drawing a map. Imagine that you awaken one day to find yourself separated from both your house and garden, or to discover that your house has been cut off from your garden. You really want to quench your thirst with a cold glass of fresh lemonade. It occurs to you that the only way to do this is for you to steal the lemons from the tree (on the other side of the divide) in a precarious smuggling operation. This project will include the design of a special belt in which the lemons will be carried in order to facilitate their transportation. There will surely be times, however, when I will not be able to use the belt (during security checks, for instance, when the belt might look to some like a suspicious explosive belt); in such instances, the lemons will be carried by hand, placed in a purse, put under my armpits, placed inside my mouth or in a pocket, etc. I will make the journey from Jerusalem to Ramallah several times, carrying another batch of lemons each time. One can never foresee the route one will have to take, the situation at the border, or the possibility of

passing through checkpoints; hence the visual documentation of the journey. I will travel through the landscape, carrying the lemons in my hand or around my waist as if I am carrying my first born child, directing her attention to the landscape in all its glory, pointing towards my favourite spots, and upon arrival rocking her gently to say: Look, we are home. Once enough lemons have been smuggled, I will host a sort of celebration during which I will attempt to dispose of all the lemons by making lemonade out of them and selling all the juice. The lemonade will be very cheap, in order to encourage consumption of all the lemons and thus to eradicate, or at least question, the very idea of the lemon tree's existence. Lemons are like jewels. They represent the wealth and glory of the earth, a historical and personal encyclopaedia of cultural attachments and baggage. They symbolize heritage, memory and longing, national identity and individual acts of 'heroism' (or the illusion thereof), destruction and loss, betrayal and abandon; at the same time, the lemons could simply negotiate a ritual procedure involving the making of a fresh glass of lemonade. (Emil Abboud, 2007)

## MEMORIES AND IMAGES INTERWEAVING

The female performance artist in *Smuggling Lemons* not only crosses a border carrying her fruits (lemons/daughter), she weaves a connection between one side and the other, passing many times through the frontier (checkpoint). I would like to expand this idea of relation work through another example. Leïla Sebbar has created a series of books – *Mes Algéries en France* (2004), *Journal de mes Algéries en France* (2005) and *Voyage en Algéries autour de ma chambre* (2008) – with various content and material: fictional stories, autobiographical stories, interviews, photos and drawings. The covers of the books are a series of images like pieces of a mosaic, each one points to a story, to a fragmented memory. They do not suggest a linear narration or succession, they belong to distant periods and situations, their order is that of the personal recollections of the narrators and of the author assembling them. The assemblage is moved by the desire 'd'abolir ce qui sépare' (Sebbar, 2005: 11). The first gap is between two countries, her parents' homelands, France and Algeria (she was born in French Algeria). Reading allows us to pass from the author's memories, to her friends' or parents' memories, or to those of unknown persons, witnesses of the tragic period of colonization and of the independence wars. The terms connection and collection are especially relevant for this careful, meticulous work, similar in some ways to that of a historian (the Preface was by Michelle Perrot); nonetheless, Sebbar is above all a writer, borrowing often the voices and memories of others. Here she arranges her own archives and offers them to the reader: objects, cards, photos of coffee-shops, schools, graveyards of the colonial period in Algeria, family portraits, portraits of famous or unknown persons in Algerian history. Her parents' photos represent the image of a crossed journey: her father's from

Algeria to France, her mother's from France to Algeria. In the colonial period in *Algérie française*, European/French clothes coexist with traditional costumes from different regions of Algeria. With these books Sebbar is not only a *diseuse de mémoire*, a witness and narrator of this memory, she is also the collector of a mixed genealogy, she has to cross colonial borders, in the act of writing her own story, to go further than this familial space; she also collects images and documents of Algerian migrants living in France. Thus she moves from the colonial past to the postcolonial present: she creates a map where one can retrace the journeys, from place to place, from one story to another, as she multiplies viewpoints, voices, narrators, sources of memory. She transforms the colonial map into a postcolonial one through a double inversion of marks: being born from the meeting of her mother's and father's two trajectories through the colonial map of French Algeria, images suggest the crossing of foot prints: France's colonial foot prints over Algerian soil (schools, language, urban space), and those of Algerian migrants in the French landscape (coffee shops, soldiers' tombs). There are the marks of the journeys of French people who migrated to Algeria or who were born there, some of whom participated in the fight for the independence of Algeria. There are many women in this narration of passionate and singular destinies, some of them little known: the nurse and obstetrician Juliette Grandgury; the great ethnographer and resistance fighter Germaine Tillion; Josette Audin, Maurice Audin's wife, dying probably after being tortured by the French army, and others. Sebbar also recalls many Algerian women who became her friends in other contexts (such as the publication of the feminist revue *Histoire d'elles*). In these pages the function of the author is exactly that of a collector of witnesses' stories, memories and prints; she performs the literary inscription of hospitality; she receives, translates from one language to another, from images to words, from memories and countries.

\* \* \*

For some borders become invisible but for others they are still there, standing strong like great brick walls, an obstacle to their desire to get to the other side, looking for freedom or for a better life. Trying to cross may end in death. So it is clear that contemporary border-crossing is very far from an ideal cosmopolitanism, which is much more an intellectual conception. Migrants are fragile, vulnerable beings: their status is precarious; as women they are often kept in or pushed back to the other side (victims of fundamentalist laws separating sexes, abolishing desires and sexual liberty). The artistic choice to perform this space of migration exposes this vulnerability of the migrant subject, making the visitor/spectator/reader the agent of an aesthetic space of dangerous crossings and precarious lives, performing for a short time a dream of hospitality without conditions.

# Group themes and readings

Thursday, 24 September 2015

13:43

1. WALLS and FENCES
  - a. Wendy Brown
  - b. Setti
2. BORDER CROSSINGS / CROSSING BORDERS
  - a. Politics of border
  - b. STÉPHANE ROSIÈRE and Jones
  - c. Parizot et al
3. MIGRATION AS EVENT / IMMIGRATION AS SURVIVAL
  - a. Held
  - b. Molodikov
  - c. Silverstein
4. CONTROL AND SURVEILLANCE
  - a. Parizot et al
  - b. Setti
  - c. STÉPHANE ROSIÈRE and Jones
5. **WAR, CONFLICT AND MIGRATION**
  - Bennet (Thomas Demand)
  - Held

after.”<sup>1</sup> Similarly, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari affirm that the time of the event “is no longer time that exists between two instants”, but a “meanwhile”, a kind of between time with its own characteristics.<sup>2</sup> This “time of the event”, they argue, is quite distinct from the historical time in which events occur. It cannot be conceived in terms of a sequential unfolding, sandwiched between a past and a future.

Social and historical events, like wars or terror campaigns, of course, have no precise temporal boundaries; it is never clear when they begin or when their effects cease to be felt. They are structured by relations with other events, and they often involve long periods when it appears that nothing is happening.<sup>3</sup> So can such events, as amorphous and indeterminate as they are, in some sense be inhabited by art, and what happens when they are?

The German artist Thomas Demand, who has consistently experimented with great events over the past ten years, produced his work *Poll* (2001) (Fig. 1) in response to the contentious count in the 2000 US Presidential election, of which he remarked:


I was astonished to note that a truly momentous political event—which some have even gone so far as to call an attempted coup d'état by far-right Republicans—was represented to the public largely via various photographs of stacks of paper...The event itself (the vote count) plays only a subordinate role here...I wanted to avoid looking through the lens of historical distance. I wanted to be so close to the real event that my pictures of it and the media coverage would become indistinguishable.<sup>4</sup>

Demand happened to be working at the time with representations of behavioural tests and commented that:

The Emergency Operations Center in Palm Beach seemed like part of a maze-based behavioural experiment—which it is in some extended sense, as the reduction of behavioural possibilities to a ballot corresponds quite nicely to the experimental setup for testing certain hypotheses about the behaviour of, say, mice.

He goes on:

The conceptual structure of *Poll* is, naturally, devoted to a very specific set of political circumstances, but whether the work has any real significance will be




**Fig. 1.** Thomas Demand. *Poll*, 2001. C-print on photographic paper and Diasec. © Thomas Demand, VG Bild Kunst, Bonn/VISCOPY Surry Hills.

evident only when *the political event recedes into the background*. In a certain sense, this work is a site-specific installation, in that the site is precisely the American short-term memory. [my emphasis]

Through the sculptural reconstruction and subsequent photographing of a location in pristine form Demand realises the “event” in its incorporeal form. As he puts it, the model forms create surroundings that are “untouched” and “utopic.” So even as the image embodies the surface and materiality of the event, it sheds the specific details of its incarnation. The formal apparatus of a ballot count is thereby transformed into a virtual site, which Demand conceptualises in terms of structure rather than texture, pointedly invoking the analogy with the behavioural experiment in which “the number of options for actions are radically limited and simplified” in the interests of producing a demonstrable result.

~~In this apparent trajectory from the actual to the virtual, *Poll* seems to invoke Deleuze’s conception of the pure event, characterised in terms of an inherent structure or problem that may be conceived in separation from its actualisation in particular circumstances. For Deleuze and Guattari: “What history grasps of the event is its~~

IN 2012, EXTREME WEATHER DROVE  
**MORE THAN 32 MILLION PEOPLE**  
FROM THEIR HOMES



**98% OF CLIMATE REFUGEES WERE FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.**



Source: Global Call for Climate Change, 2013


### **The European Union and the Mediterranean migrant crisis: a case study**

Migration from North Africa to Europe is certainly not new. For years the Mediterranean has been a thoroughfare for migrants trying to reach the shores of Europe. Whilst migrants have started their journeys from many African and Middle Eastern countries, they are typically bound by a common goal to find greater economic and social opportunities, escape persecution and flee conflict. However, there are notable differences in migration patterns over the last few years.

First, there has been a generalised increase of would-be-migrants attempting to reach Europe. Second, there has been a dramatic rise in the departures that travel via the Central Mediterranean route. In fact, the EU Border Agency, Frontex, estimates that between 2013 and 2014 there was a 277% increase (see figure 3). Third, and bearing in mind UNEP's projections for environmental refugees in Africa, the push from Africa is only likely to intensify in the

future.

Figure 3. Increase in migration flows, 2013-2014




Source: FRAN data in Frontex 2015a

Across the Mediterranean migration is increasing, but nowhere more dramatically than from Libya. From figures 4 and 5, one can see the apparent correlation between migration flows through the Central Mediterranean and the regional instability in North Africa. 2011 was a period of optimism and migration from Libya declined; but it has been exponentially rising since. The majority of the migrants are not Libyan per se. Rather, the greatest number of migrants to date have originated from Syria, Eritrea and Somalia, but there are significant numbers also from Nigeria, Gambia and Mali just to name a few. The instability and chaos that



grips Libya has created a vacuum for armed groups, smugglers, gangsters and human traffickers to operate at will; hence, Libya has become the dominant point of departure for many.

Figure 4. Fluctuations in popularity of routes to Europe




Source: Frontex in IOM 2014


Figure 5. Recent trends in and nationalities of illegal border crossovers

## Trend

### Quarterly detections of illegal border-crossing, 2014-2015



## Nationalities



Source: Frontex 2015b

The current Mediterranean migration crisis is in many respects a symptom of Western policy failures in two key respects. First, the failed intervention in Libya created the instability that led to the Central Mediterranean route becoming so popular as a passage to Europe. Second, the European countries scaled back recovery efforts just at a time when they were needed the most. From late 2013 to November/December 2014 the Italian government ran a relatively effective operation called Mare Nostrum, during which time more than 100,000 migrants were rescued at sea.

However, the operation was costly at €9 million a month, and Italy cancelled it at the end of 2014 claiming that it was unsustainable without more EU financial backing. In place of Mare Nostrum the EU launched the much-scaled back operation Triton. Under Mare Nostrum the Italian Navy carried out search and rescue operations across 27,000 miles of the Mediterranean. Under Triton, the mandate only covered border surveillance within 30 miles of the Italian coast. The EU budget for Triton was only a third of what was spent on Mare Nostrum. To those who paid attention at the time, this was a huge, bright, waving red flag. Human rights groups and migration experts warned, with virtual consensus, that this would lead to a much larger migration crisis with many more deaths in the Mediterranean.

In the face of renewed crisis (and many deaths) the EU initiated discussions about how to address the Mediterranean migrant dilemma. On the 29th of April 2015 the EU Council released its summary of their 28 country talks. The agenda moving forward can be summarised in three points: confront and prevent smugglers and human traffickers from operating; triple the financial resources for EU border operations including the increase of ships and other necessary capacity; and enhance refugee protection. For the latter, this includes implementing a 'Common European Asylum System to ensure the same standards in all Member States, an increase of emergency aid to front-line Member States, and the deployment of support teams to help process asylum claims' (European Council 2015).

This could have gone a long way towards mitigating the escalating tragedy in the Mediterranean. However, it would certainly be a mistake to consider the matter closed and problem solved, even if the EU were able to bring casualties to zero. Upon close inspection of the EU's plan, it is clear that it has continued to be driven primarily by an exclusionary regional interest to manage and control migration into Europe. These are policies that, whilst having a humanitarian veneer, radically exacerbate the burdens of migrants and displaced persons from and in countries like Libya, Syria, Eritrea, and Somalia. Stefan Kessler captures the underlying motive behind the EU's new approach: 'Keep protection-seekers far, far away from Europe so that their deaths don't make the headlines in European media' (in Siegfried 2015). Moreover, a conspicuous absence from this response is the increasing concern with climate-induced displacement and migratory flows. Instead, migration continues to be conceived through a security-specific lens, deliberately missing larger parts of the picture. But it is clear that the policy has failed both in its narrow objectives and in wider terms as migration flows put pressure on multiple entry points into Europe, from Macedonia to Italy, Greece to France. Some of these pressures have now become so great that these entry points are almost ungovernable. It remains to be seen how the interplay between state migration policy and actual migratory movements play out, with some countries, notably Germany and Sweden, currently liberalising their border policies, while others, the UK and Hungary for instance, are resisting such moves.

To be sure, these problems are difficult to resolve. The issue of refugees and displaced peoples is one of the great tests of the international humanitarian ideals of the 21st century, and of the cosmopolitan aspirations of a Europe shaped by ambition to project its soft power and good governance across the world. However, when cosmopolitanism meets state interests under economic pressure, the former is often cast aside. Europe, racked by the Euro crisis, has become a partial, and all too often sorrowful, champion of humanitarian values. There is a paradox wherein many European states are cosmopolitan when it comes to championing ideals, but remain sectarian when it comes to their implementation.

### **Concluding remarks**

The growing crisis of migration, as Pierre Hassner once wrote, “like the problem of genocide, or of the environment, or of nuclear proliferation, can be handled only by going beyond the monopoly of states toward a more universal perspective, such as that of human rights, or a more global one, such as that of a collective interest of the planet” (1998, p.281). As Hassner recognised, the question is whether “an effective synthesis of the global and the local, the universal and the particular” remains within the sphere of the possible (ibid.).

Stepping stones to a universal constitutional order, linking the global and the local, are, I have argued elsewhere, already in place, set down by some of the most important achievements of international law and institution building in the 20th century (see Held 2010). These developments generate a conception of rightful authority tied to human rights and democratic values. In this perspective, political power is legitimate, if, and only if, it upholds these standards. Moreover, the link between territory, sovereignty, and rightful authority, is, in principle, broken since rightful authority can be exercised in many spheres and many levels – local, subnational, national and supranational. Accordingly, citizenship can be envisaged, as it already is in the EU, as equal membership in the diverse, overlapping political communities, which uphold common civic political values and standards. Citizenship, accordingly, is not built on exclusive membership in a single community, but on a set of principles and legal arrangements which link people together in diverse communities which significantly affect them.

Stepping stones, yes. But it remains another big step to extend these principles and arrangements to the stateless. Short term extensions policies in the EU could include: centrally funded reception centres; coordinated legal routes through which migrants can travel safely to seek refuge; robust asylum quotas for all member states; tackling human trafficking; and providing direct aid to refugee camps in the Middle East which are currently home to millions of displaced people. Short term working visas and limited working passes are also among options to ease the crises of the stateless while offering universal hospitality in an era of overlapping communities of fate.

Even if this were granted (and we are a long way from this happening), the problem would only be stemmed – not resolved. Only when people live securely in a world where sustainable development is promoted in all regions, where severe inequalities between countries are tempered and reduced, and where a universal constitutional order guarantees the rights of all peoples, could this begin to be envisaged. Cosmopolitan ideals, but still, far from realities.