Group themes and readings

Thursday, 24 September 2015   13:43

1. WALLS and FENCES
   a. Wendy Brown
   b. Setti
2. BORDER CROSSINGS / CROSSING BORDERS
   a. Politics of border
   b. STÉPHANE ROSIÈRE and Jones
   c. Parizot et al
3. MIGRATION AS EVENT / IMMIGRATION AS SURVIVAL
   a. Held
   b. Molodikov
   c. Silverstein
4. CONTROL AND SURVEILLANCE
   a. Parizot et al
   b. Setti
   c. STÉPHANE ROSIÈRE and Jones
5. WAR, CONFLICT AND MIGRATION
   o Bennet (Thomas Demand)
   o Held

IN 2012, EXTREME WEATHER DROVE
MORE THAN 32 MILLION PEOPLE
FROM THEIR HOMES

USA
776,000
displaced

PAKISTAN
1.9 Million
displaced

BANGLADESH
600,000
displaced

CHINA
5.5 Million
displaced

NORTH KOREA
9.1 Million
displaced

CHAD
500,000
displaced

JAPAN
250,000
displaced

NIGER
530,000
displaced

S.SUDAN
340,000
displaced

CUBA
343,000
displaced

MADAGASCAR
190,000
displaced

NIGERIA
6.1 Million
displaced

INDIA
9.1 Million
displaced

PERU
138,000
displaced

PHILIPPINES
3.6 Million
displaced

98% OF CLIMATE REFUGEES WERE FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.

Source: Global Call for Climate Change, 2013

The European Union and the Mediterranean migrant crisis: a case study

Migration from North Africa to Europe is certainly not new. For years the Mediterranean has been a thoroughfare for migrants trying to reach the shores of Europe. Whilst migrants have started their journeys from many African and Middle Eastern countries, they are typically bound by a common goal to find greater economic and social opportunities, escape persecution and flee conflict. However, there are notable differences in migration patterns over the last few years.

First, there has been a generalised increase of would-be-migrants attempting to reach Europe. Second, there has been a dramatic rise in the departures that travel via the Central Mediterranean route. In fact, the EU Border Agency, Frontex, estimates that between 2013 and 2014 there was a 277% increase (see figure 3). Third, and bearing in mind UNEP's projections for environmental refugees in Africa, the push from Africa is only likely to intensify in the

future.

Figure 3. Increase in migration flows, 2013-2014

Source: FRAN data in Frontex 2015a

Across the Mediterranean migration is increasing, but nowhere more dramatically than from Libya. From figures 4 and 5, one can see the apparent correlation between migration flows through the Central Mediterranean and the regional instability in North Africa. 2011 was a period of optimism and migration from Libya declined; but it has been exponentially rising since. The majority of the migrants are not Libyan per se. Rather, the greatest number of migrants to date have originated from Syria, Eritrea and Somalia, but there are significant numbers also from Nigeria, Gambia and Mali just to name a few. The instability and chaos that

grips Libya has created a vacuum for armed groups, smugglers, gangsters and human traffickers to operate at will; hence, Libya has become the dominant point of departure for many.

Figure 4. Fluctuations in popularity of routes to Europe


Source: Frontex in IOM 2014

Figure 5. Recent trends in and nationalities of illegal border crossovers

Source: Frontex 2015b

The current Mediterranean migration crisis is in many respects a symptom of Western policy failures in two key respects. First, the failed intervention in Libya created the instability that led to the Central Mediterranean route becoming so popular as a passage to Europe. Second, the European countries scaled back recovery efforts just at a time when they were needed the most. From late 2013 to November/December 2014 the Italian government ran a relatively effective operation called Mare Nostrum, during which time more than 100,000 migrants were rescued at sea.

However, the operation was costly at €9 million a month, and Italy cancelled it at the end of 2014 claiming that it was unsustainable without more EU financial backing. In place of Mare Nostrum the EU launched the much-scaled back operation Triton. Under Mare Nostrum the Italian Navy carried out search and rescue operations across 27,000 miles of the Mediterranean. Under Triton, the mandate only covered border surveillance within 30 miles of the Italian coast. The EU budget for Triton was only a third of what was spent on Mare Nostrum. To those who paid attention at the time, this was a huge, bright, waving red flag. Human rights groups and migration experts warned, with virtual consensus, that this would lead to a much larger migration crisis with many more deaths in the Mediterranean.

In the face of renewed crisis (and many deaths) the EU initiated discussions about how to address the Mediterranean migrant dilemma. On the 29th of April 2015 the EU Council released its summary of their 28 country talks. The agenda moving forward can be summarised in three points: confront and prevent smugglers and human traffickers from operating; triple the financial resources for EU border operations including the increase of ships and other necessary capacity; and enhance refugee protection. For the latter, this includes implementing a 'Common European Asylum System to ensure the same standards in all Member States, an increase of emergency aid to front-line Member States, and the deployment of support teams to help process asylum claims' (European Council 2015).

This could have gone a long way towards mitigating the escalating tragedy in the Mediterranean. However, it would certainly be a mistake to consider the matter closed and problem solved, even if the EU were able to bring casualties to zero. Upon close inspection of the EU's plan, it is clear that is has continued to be driven primarily by an exclusionary regional interest to manage and control migration into Europe. These are policies that, whilst having a humanitarian veneer, radically exacerbate the burdens of migrants and displaced persons from and in countries like Libya, Syria, Eritrea, and Somalia. Stefan Kessler captures the underlying motive behind the EU's new approach: 'Keep protection-seekers far, far away from Europe so that their deaths don't make the headlines in European media' (in Siegfried 2015). Moreover, a conspicuous absence from this response is the increasing concern with climate-induced displacement and migratory flows. Instead, migration continues to be conceived through a security-specific lens, deliberately missing larger parts of the picture. But it is clear that the policy has failed both in its narrow objectives and in wider terms as migration flows put pressure on multiple entry points into Europe, from Macedonia to Italy, Greece to France. Some of these pressures have now become so great that these entry points are almost ungovernable. It remains to be seen how the interplay between state migration policy and actual migratory movements play out, with some countries, notably Germany and Sweden, currently liberalising their border policies, while others, the UK and Hungary for instance, are resisting such moves.

To be sure, these problems are difficult to resolve. The issue of refugees and displaced peoples is one of the great tests of the international humanitarian ideals of the 21st century, and of the cosmopolitan aspirations of a Europe shaped by ambition to project its soft power and good governance across the world. However, when cosmopolitanism meets state interests under economic pressure, the former is often cast aside. Europe, racked by the Euro crisis, has become a partial, and all too often sorrowful, champion of humanitarian values. There is a paradox wherein many European states are cosmopolitan when it comes to championing ideals, but remain sectarian when it comes to their implementation.

Concluding remarks

The growing crisis of migration, as Pierre Hassner once wrote, "like the problem of genocide, or of the environment, or of nuclear proliferation, can be handled only by going beyond the monopoly of states toward a more universal perspective, such as that of human rights, or a more global one, such as that of a collective interest of the planet" (1998, p.281). As Hassner recognised, the question is whether "an effective synthesis of the global and the local, the universal and the particular" remains within the sphere of the possible (ibid.).

Stepping stones to a universal constitutional order, linking the global and the local, are, I have argued elsewhere, already in place, set down by some of the most important achievements of international law and institution building in the 20th century (see Held 2010). These developments generate a conception of rightful authority tied to human rights and democratic values. In this perspective, political power is legitimate, if, and only if, it upholds these standards. Moreover, the link between territory, sovereignty, and rightful authority, is, in principle, broken since rightful authority can be exercised in many spheres and many levels – local, subnational, national and supranational. Accordingly, citizenship can be envisaged, as it already is in the EU, as equal membership in the diverse, overlapping political communities, which uphold common civic political values and standards. Citizenship, accordingly, is not built on exclusive membership in a single community, but on a set of principles and legal arrangements which link people together in diverse communities which significantly affect them.

Stepping stones, yes. But it remains another big step to extend these principles and arrangements to the stateless. Short term extensions policies in the EU could include: centrally funded reception centres; coordinated legal routes through which migrants can travel safely to seek refuge; robust asylum quotas for all member states; tackling human trafficking; and providing direct aid to refugee camps in the Middle East which are currently home to millions of displaced people. Short term working visas and limited working passes are also among options to ease the crises of the stateless while offering universal hospitality in an era of overlapping communities of fate.

Even if this were granted (and we are a long way from this happening), the problem would only be stemmed – not resolved. Only when people live securely in a world where sustainable development is promoted in all regions, where severe inequalities between countries are tempered and reduced, and where a universal constitutional order guarantees the rights of all peoples, could this begin to be envisaged. Cosmopolitan ideals, but still, far from realities.

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The refugee crisis is waking old fears in central Europe

Irina Molodikova

Muslim migrants are finding little welcome in countries such as Hungary and Croatia

Sunday 20 September 2015 06.05 BST

The ethnic background of refugees has changed hugely over the past several decades. In the 1990s, after the fall of the iron curtain, most were Europeans, mostly Christian. Now most are Muslims from Asia and Africa.

Undoubtedly, the expansion of the European Union has increased its internal heterogeneity, but when the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, mentioned that Muslims are already part of the culture of many EU countries, these were words that were not given the same welcome in all countries.

Expansion of the EU eastwards meant an incorporation of countries whose values might not be entirely in line with the European "norm". What we are seeing now is in part an expression of that tension, a need to balance the EU's security interests on the one hand and the interests of the development of democracy and protection of human rights on the other.

The increasing numbers of people seeking asylum has thrown into the air a simple "progressive" development of Europe. Instead, the sometimes hostile reception given to migrants and refugees, the closing of borders, even the possibility of the exit of some countries from the Schengen agreement has taken us back into history, and in particular, the specific history of this part of the world.

Remember that the refugees are now flowing through the Balkan countries that, only 20 years ago, were the scene of inter-ethnic bloodshed. The Balkans had long been under the rule of the Ottoman empire and attitudes towards Muslims in many places are ambivalent, at best. (And the truth is that most countries in central and south-western Europe are, in turn, not attractive for asylum seekers, but are rather mere transit countries.)

Life in the Balkans might have changed substantially. But still fears of politicians reflect the fears of the population (and vice versa). The sudden arrival of large numbers of Muslim refugees does not make local people there happy. This is true also for

Hungary, which historically was under Turkish rule for about 150 years. Croatia has similar attitudes, perhaps remembering the story of their former compatriots from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo.

Let us also remember that during the Balkan wars in early 1990s Hungary opened its borders for its neighbours and adopted a large number of asylum seekers and refugees. Now the situation is different: Hungary, as well as its new EU neighbour Croatia, is closing its borders.

Another fearsome new factor for Hungary, which routinely was receiving about 2,000 asylum applications a year, is to suddenly find itself fielding the most asylum applications per million of population. In the second quarter of 2015 for Hungary the figure was 3,317 per million people, compared with Austria (2,026), Sweden (1,476) and Germany (997). In Croatia there were only six per million. The EU average was 26.

This new wave of migrants originates mostly from Syria (21%), Afghanistan (12%) and Iraq (6%), as well as Albania (8%) and Kosovo (5%).

Usually refugees fleeing for their lives head for their neighbouring countries, in the hope that they will be able to return home soon. Those countries usually have already respective diasporas who can come to the rescue. No one wants specifically, to risk their lives, if they know that they can get help just across the border.

I remember my visit to one of the Turkish refugee camps back in 2008, where they kept people who wanted to go to the EU, close to the border with Greece. The small cells were for 70 persons each, and three times a day they were given only bread and water. The Turkish officer asked: "Why do we have to keep these people and feed them if they want to go to the EU and do not want to stay here? Greek border guards, pushing them back to us." Little has changed since then.

For a long time, problems with the observance of the rights of refugees have been noted in all border countries. This has been discussed by EU experts and NGOs, but made little impact on the public. Now the secret has been revealed, the Balkan countries, including parts of the EU, have given up their role on protection.

Establishing quotas and strengthening borders does not look like the solution. Therefore it will be useful to have a system of collective responsibility for dealing with the crisis. It is necessary not only to provide humanitarian aid for those who are living in refugee camps but also to create a scheme of study and work for young people in troubled countries, to prepare their new elite.

According to the Gatestone institute, most who manage to come to the EU are young men aged 16-20 years. They make up 80% of all arrivals to Germany. Refugees are with us, and around us in the neighbouring countries. If we do not help them, we will marginalise them. And then – further down the line – they will follow those who promise them a better life and they will believe in it.

Dr Irina Molodikova runs the Project on Migration and Security, Central European University, Budapest

● · *Comments will be opened later this morning*

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Hargreaves 1995; Hargreaves & McKinney 1997).

Ethnographies of postcolonial migration to Europe have increasingly focused on such avowals of hybridity as demonstrated within various immigrant social practices and cultural productions. The immigrant association, for instance, has become a privileged object of study, both in terms of its serendipitous provision of access for fieldworkers to otherwise dispersed and invisible communities [Diouf 2002, pp. 149–52; Silverstein 2004, pp. 11–13; Suárez-Navaz 2004; on the subject of migrant (in)visibility in relation to questions of illegality and deportability, see also De Genova 2001, Haddad & Smith 2002, Kearney 1986, MacGaffey & Bazenguissa-Ganga 2000, Smith 2003, Ticktin 2002] and also in terms of its salience as spaces of immigrant articulation and response to larger racialized ideologies and institutions (Grillo 1985, Rex et al. 1987). Such work has likewise focused on the various media productions and instantiation of multicultural difference, from Turkish news media in Amsterdam (Ogan 2001) to Algerian community radio in France (Derderian 2004), to the black British and Franco-Maghrebi production of reggae and rap music (Gilroy 1987, Gross et al. 1994). These works bear witness to how larger anthropological assessments of a "world in creolisation" (Hannerz 1987) can be similarly discovered in de facto "creolized" nation-states like France (Beriss 2004, pp. 132–33). In these ways, through state anxiety, sociological description, immigrant avowal, anthropological celebration, and corporate commodification, the postcolonial, second-generation immigrant in Europe becomes a racialized vector for the study of multiculturalism and global cosmopolitanism.

The Transmigrant

Governmental concerns over the failure of immigrant cultural assimilation in Europe —particularly since the spread of Middle Eastern conflicts from Algeria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Turkey to Europe beginning in the mid-1980s and the social dramas overveiling in France since 1989—have been translated into larger fears over the transnationality of European Muslims, over the nature of Euro-Islam (whether it is an Islam of Europe or simply an Islam in Europe) and its implication for the future of national loyalty and participatory citizenship in European national polities (see Cesari 1998, 2004; Kepel 1991, 1997; Lamchichi 1999; Leveau et al. 2002; Lewis & Schnapper 1994; Roy 2004). Lewis (1994), for one, in his introduction to a collection on *Muslims in Europe*, contributes directly to the essentialization of Euro-Muslims as part of a singular, ahistorical Islamic world, reading back current internal debates and struggles over the adoption of Muslim practices in the European context as contemporary expressions of timeless theological debates over the meaning of *hijra* (migration). He ends the essay by recounting his surprise when meeting a Franco-Maghrebi, who explained to him, "My father was a Muslim, but I am a Parisian" (p. 18). Rather than seeing in this opposition a polysemous flexibility in the meaning of religious and geographic categories, he concludes by positing a conflict between the two irreconcilable ideological poles (compare Lewis 1990). Such postulations of a trans-historical civilizational clash point to larger national anxieties over the uncontrolled and uncontrollable penetration of the nation-state by transnational ethnic and religious movements originating from and ideologically tied to abroad.

In many ways, scholars like Lewis have contributed to the racialization of certain immigrant groups (and Muslims in particular) as preternaturally transnational, with enduring cultural orientations to homelands elsewhere. To a great extent, this focus of European migration studies indexes the decline of economic and sociological analyses of migration in favor of anthropological and political science models of diasporas, globalization, and transnationalism (see Kearney 1995 for a review of this literature). In particular, the

adoption of world systems approaches into mainstream political science challenged the ability to characterize migrations as a uni-directional flow between one nation-state and another. Instead, postnational solidarities, based on ethnicity, race, or religion, were constituted as the cultural political organization of the future. Migrants, and transmigrants in particular, have become largely iconic of such a world in which state and national boundaries are traversed by various social networks and scapes (Glick Schiller 1999; compare Appadurai 1996).

Within European migration studies, a transnational reality was asserted as early as 1981 in the formulation a "new paradigm," in which mobility and transformation were reinterpreted as the natural state of human civilization (Kubat & Nowotony 1981). French researchers, for instance, began to question whether migratory flows were not spelling out "the end of the national" and the beginning of the "transnational" (Catani 1986) and began to explore the links between immigration and international relations (Badie 1995, Badie & Wihtol de Wenden 1994). In recent years, ethnographers have provocatively explored the ways in which various kinds of cultural and religious spaces were being mapped out in European geographies through ritualized enactments of Caribbean carnival (Cohen 1993) or Sufi processions that "sacralize alien cityscapes" (Werbner 1996, p. 310; see also Carter 1997, Mandel 1996, Metcalf 1996). These processes are central to the ways in which transnational spheres, linking Pakistan and Britain, Senegal and Italy, Algeria and France, Turkey and Germany, are constituted, leading researchers to embrace neologisms like "*Deutschkei*" (a German union of *Deutschland* and *Türkei*) (Argun 2003, p. 6) or "Touba Turin" (Carter 1997, p. 55) as the most adequate toponyms to describe these new trans-state entities (see also White 1997).

However, such a focus on "transpolitics" (Silverstein 2004) and its relation to migration has never been purely an academic concern.

Indeed, like the World Bank's 1983 Integrated Computer-Based Manpower Forecasting Model discussed above, international bodies such as the ILO and the OECD have sought to develop more sophisticated and comprehensive models to account for the decreasing national framework of migration patterns and for approaching the new migrant-as-nomad theory (compare Kritz et al. 1992). In the new model, multinational corporations, regional bodies (such as the European Union), and autonomous social networks come to represent competing players for which previous state-centered theories, employed in the past, can no longer account. Such a state-level adoption of a transnational perspective must therefore be viewed as part of a larger effort to support national formations understood as threatened, particularly in the context of immigrant communities that deploy burgeoning supranational institutions and legal regimes to argue for cultural and linguistic rights in the European societies in which they live (Kastoryano 1994, 2002; Soysal 1994). More generally, in approaching Muslim immigrants and their children as transmigrants—as participating directly in a border-defying form of global Islam— European states construct an ultimate abject people, a problem not simply solvable through national integration policies. In outlining such an abject relation, migration studies and state policy collude in the representation of migrants as effectively occupying a newly exoticized and racialized savage slot.

CONCLUSION

The above genealogy of different racializations of migrants indicates the dialectical relationship between state racial formations and migration studies. Successive and overlapping racial categories of nomad, laborer, uprooted victim, hybrid, and transmigrant reflect not only transformations in scholars' analytical tools but different articulations of global capital and national formations in colonial and postcolonial contexts.

Although the particular characteristics attributed to migrant populations have changed with each discursive shift, what remains constant is that the incipient mobility of immigrants, within the context of a European nation-state system based historically on the fixity of spatial and cultural borders [itself under threat by processes of Europeanization (Borneman & Fowler 1997)], constitutes them as a racial problem that states, scholars, and immigrant populations themselves have been compelled to address. In this respect, citizenship and multicultural policies in Europe remain the privileged contemporary sites where such problems are expressed and debated, and it is of little wonder that these areas have attracted so much recent ethnographic attention (Amselle 2003, Bauman 1996, Beriss 2004, Holmes 2000, Kastoryano 2002, Shukla 2003, Suárez-Navaz 2004, Werbner 2002, Wikan 2002).

It is tempting to conclude this review pessimistically, seeing racialization as essentially a process of the state disciplining immigrant difference and mobility into commensurable citizens and commodifiable cultures. However, one must not forget that such racial categorization is itself productive, the condition of possibility for immigrant solidarity in and across cultural lines. It is certainly true that the histories of immigration, capital, and race have often divided diasporic and immigrant populations, producing Little Indias (Axel 2001, Shukla 2003), Arab Frances (McMurray 1997), Senegalese Turins (Carter 1997), and Turkish Colognes (Clark 1977; compare Argun 2003, p. 9); that working-class racism (Balibar 1991) and late capitalist uncertainties continue to construct migrants as "alien-nations" semantically allied with zombies and other uncontrollable monstrous forces (Comaroff & Comaroff 1999). Nevertheless, these racializations are never fixed, and crossings across racial frontiers are, in many settings, as much the norm as the exception (compare Palumbo-Liu 1999, Rampton 1995). Such crossings are the condition of possibility for solidarity (Prashad 2000), for a "new *convivencia* (living-together)" (Suárez-Navaz 2004, pp. 191–220), and it is the task of an anthropology of the present to explore the cultural conditions of not just disjuncture and difference, but also of conjuncture and convergence.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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